"FORGIVE U.S. ITS
TRESPASSES?": LAND TITLE DISPUTES
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The United States is the owner of some 755 million acres of
land-almost one-third the total acreage of the nation.' Nearly 700
million of these acres constitute what remains of the original public
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1. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CON-

GRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 19-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
PLLRC REPORT]. The Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) was established in 1964
to make a comprehensive review of the public land laws of the United States and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, and to determine whether and to what extent revisions
thereof are necessary. Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982. The research program of the Commission included staff and consultant studies of some 33 individual subject areas and provides an
invaluable source of information about the public lands. The individual manuscripts and their
availability are listed in PLLRC REPORT 318-19. All the records and files of the Commission
have been deposited in the National Archives in approximately 50 large rather dusty cardboard
boxes, and may be examined there by the public.
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[hereinafter cited as Hearingson Sovereign Immunity];
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The Need for Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject MatterJurisdiction,and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 387 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cramton];
S. 216, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as SENATE PASSED BILL];
S.2805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE BILL].
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domain. 2 while the remaining 55 million have been acquired from
non-federal owners. 3 Although almost half of it is in Alaska, some 400
million acres are located within the continental states-especially in
the West.' Because federal land ownership is so pervasiveMinnesota, for example, has federal lands which exceed the area
of Connecticut, and ten other non-western states each contain federal
lands which approximate or exceed the area of Delaware 5-it is vitally
important in almost all the states. It is even important in urban areas.
where the federal government is becoming, albeit unwillingly, a signif2. The original federal public domain consisted of cessions by seven of the original states
to the federal government of some 233.4 million acres lying westward of their present boundaries
to the Mississippi River. Thereafter, through purchase and treaty, the United States acquired
an additional billion or more acres. PLLRC DIGEST OF PuBLIc LAND LAWS vii (1968) (prepared
for the PLLRC by Shepard's Citations, Inc.).
3. The bulk of the federal land subject to the PLLRC's review is managed by the Bureau
of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. The Bureau is responsible for 62% of
the total, including the more than 465 million acres of public land which have never been set
aside for particular uses. This is principally land not considered suitable for farming or for
inclusion in national parks and forests; about two-thirds of it is in Alaska. The United States
Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture manages 25%, the Department of Defense 4%,
the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior 4% and the National Park
Service of the Department of the Interior 3%. All other agencies manage a total of 2%. PLLRC
REPORT 20-22, 331-34.
In the last ten years, more than 200,000 individual parcels containing more than ten million
acres have been acquired by purchase and condemnation by the United States at a total cost in
excess of SI.6 billion. At the present time, some 18,000 parcels of land are being acquired in
pending condemnation cases. Kashiwa, The United States and Its Relation to the Land Title
Profession,40 TITLE NEws 2 (Aug. 1971).
4. Federally owned land in the I I western states totals about 350 million acres and is
distributed in percentages of total state area as follows: Arizona 44.6%; California 44.3%;
Colorado 36.3%; Idaho 63.9%; Montana 29.6%; Nevada 86.4%; New Mexico 33.9%; Oregon
52.2%; Utah 66.5%; Washington 29.4%; Wyoming 48.2%. In Alaska, 95.3% of all land is
federally owned. PLLRC REPORT 327. A sizable portion of the federally owned acreage in
Alaska is subject to disposition under rights granted by Congress to the state and to Alaska
natives, although the exact extent of such rights is in dispute. Alaska Statehood Law of
1958 § 4, 72 Stat. 339, as amended, Alaska Omnibus Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 141; Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, P.L. 92-203 (1971),
5. Fifteen non-western states, plus the District of Columbia, each have 5% or more of their
total land area federally owned, as follows: Arkansas 9.4%; District of Columbia 28.4%; Florida
9.8%; Georgia 5.6%; Hawaii 9.7%; Michigan 9.1%; Minnesota 6.7%; Mississippi 5.2%; New
Hampshire 12.2%; North Carolina 6.2%; South Carolina 5.8%; South Dakota 7.0%; Tennessee
6.4%; Virginia 8.6%; West Virginia 6.4%; Wisconsin 5.1%. The percentage of federal land in
the remaining states is as follows: Alabama 3.4%; Connecticut 0.3%; Delaware 3.0%; Illinois
1.5%; Indiana 1.8%; Iowa 0.6%; Kansas 1.3%; Kentucky 4.8%; Louisiana 3.6%; Maine 0.7%;
Maryland 3.0%; Massachusetts 1.4%; Missouri 4.3%; Nebraska 1.5%; New Jersey 2.3%; New
York 0.8%; North Dakota 4.8%; Ohio 1.0%; Oklahoma 3.2%; Pennsylvania 2.1%; Rhode Island
1.2%; Texas 1.8%; Vermont 4.4%. PLLRC REPORT 327.
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icant land owner.6 The United States has, in addition, granted or sold
over one billion acres of land 7 often retaining property interests of
one sort or another.5 The scope of contact between federal and private
land interests is indicated by the length of the boundaries between the
national forests alone and privately owned land, which are estimated
to total over 270.000 miles ' -the approximate distance to the moon.10
In this setting, it is inevitable that land title disputes will arise
between the United States and private parties." It will, therefore, be
the purpose of this article to examine the judicial remedies presently
6. U.S. Now Big Landlordin DacayingInner City, N.Y. Times, January 2, 1972, at I, col.
4. The article quotes George Sternlieb, Director of the Center for Urban Policy Research at
Rutgers University, and a member of President Nixon's task force on housing, as noting that
there is every indication that the federal government through the process of foreclosures, defaults
of mortgage payments and overseeing the management of federally subsidized projects on the
verge of bankruptcy will "end up owning or operating a high percentage of housing in the
central cities."

7. PLLRC

REPORT

27.

8. The major examples appear to be "(I) outstanding interests of the United States in
railroad rights-of-way, (2) mineral and other reservations in dispositions of lands under the
public land laws and (3) defeasible titles or interests granted under the public land laws." Letter
from Acting Secretary of the Interior to Wayne N. Aspinall, dated September 6, 1963, in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3746, 3750. See also 43 U.S.C. § 1424 (1970) ("patents and
other evidences of title may contain such reservations and reasonable restrictions as are necessary in the public interest . . ."); Exceptions and Reservations in United States Patents to
Public Lands, 35 TITLE NEws 2 (Mar. 1956). The PLLRC recommends even greater use of
covenants and easements, both in disposal of land and its acquisition. PLLRC REPORT 82-83,
214, 268. The federal government also holds reserved mineral interests in over 62 million acres
of land, the surface of which is in non-federal ownership. PLLRC REPORT 137.
9. Of the 270,000 miles of boundary, approximately 253,000 need to be established or reestablished. PLLRC REPORT 260. The national forests comprise about 180 million acres. Id.
at 21.
10. This distance, in the author's boyhood used as a common measurement for near-infinity,
seems these days to be much less impressive; as a mostly undefined boundary line, however, it
still is a long string of miles.
11. For economy of words, "land" shall be defined to include all interests in real property.
The opposing party in a dispute with the United States-who may be an individual, private
corporation or state or local governmental unit-over title to a real property interest shall be
called a "private disputant." A dispute over title to real property interests between a private
disputant and the United States is a "land title dispute with the United States." Such a dispute
between two private disputants is a "private land dispute."
An interesting and vivid example of how such land disputes may arise, and the course they
may take, is the North Carolina case where a forest ranger faced trial on a charge that he had
his men bulldoze a large hole and-bury a-man's mobile home and-barn in it. These actions
allegedly occurred after a dispute over ownership of about an acre of mountain land. "The
United States Forest Service considers the land part of the Pisgah-'-tionaFForest, but 89-year
old Cannon McColl argues that he laid claim to the land legally several years ago after it had
ceased being used as a school site." N.Y. Times, March 7, 1971, § I, at 35.
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available to such private parties and to explore the prospects and
problems of statutory reform in that narrow, if somewhat neglected,"2

cranny 13 of the law.

12. Although historical reviews of the management and disposal of the public domain are
many, there is a surprising paucity of legal source material relating specifically to the intricacies
of judicial relief in land title disputes with the United States. Within the past several years,
however, as discussed in this article, an upsurge of interest has developed and important reform
steps seem underway. Most significant is the recent formal proposal by the United States
Department of Justice that legislation be enacted permitting quiet title suits against the United
States and the subsequent passage by the Senate of such a bill. See notes 286-87 infra and
accompanying text. The saga of United States public land history, rich in romance and intrigue,
is described in P. GATES & R. SWENSON, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968)
(which also has an extensive bibliography at 773-96). See also V. CARSTENSEN, THE PUBLIC
LANDS (1963); M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT
(1957); M. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS (1968).
13. "Nook" would have been the alliterative choice of words, but it was replaced by
"cranny" when I foupd that the latter was defined as an "obscure nook." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 194 (1967).
Outside the scope of this article is any detailed, specialized discussion of the body of law
relating to disputes between private individuals and the United States arising out of administrative activities in relation to public lands. A massive study of judicial review of determinations
made by the executive branch relating to land use and disposal appears in Scalia, Sovereign
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions
From the Public-LandCases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1970). See also C. MCFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS (1969); Peak, JudicialReview ofAdministrative
Actions of the Bureau of Land Management and Secretary of the Interior, 9 ROCKY MOUNT.
L. REv. 225 (1964); Comment, The Conservationistsand the Public Lands:Administrative and
Judicial Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of the Public Lands Administered by
the Department of the Interior,68 MICH. L. REV. 1200 (1970). Some similarity, of course, exists
between this area and the garden-variety dispute over property rights, but conceptually a distinction may be drawn between situations where an individual is resisting a governmental assertion
of ownership, or another property right, in land that he claims he owns and situations where he
claims a denial of alleged rights vis-a-vis the sovereign-for example, the denial of a grazing
permit, mining claim or lease, see, e.g., Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970); Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Cord v. Morton, 449 F.2d 327 (1971), or their cancellation as
authorized by law. See, e.g., Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963). Put another way, in the
former case the individual's dispute is over a governmental claim of ownership to his property;
in the latter, he is usually complaining about how the government is managing or disposing of
its own property. See note 61 infra.
Of course, in the former type of case, which involves disputed title, judicial interpretation
of the public land laws may be required where the individual's claimed property interest turns
upon the legal effect of some bygone action (or inaction) of the federal government-usually
relating to the land's disposition-that is, the dispute is over the effect of administrative action
rather than the legality of the action itself. See, e.g., Ward v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 321 F.2d
775 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. MacMillan, 331 F. Supp. 435 (D. Nev. 1971); Seiford v.
United States, 280 F. Supp. 443 (D. Mont. 1968). It should also be observed that certain rights
of individuals to public lands have been labeled as a form of property right, even though further
procedures are required before "title" is bestowed by formal patent. A mining claim on public
lands has, for example, been characterized as a "unique form of property"-that is, a "posses-
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LAND TITLE DISPUTES WITH THE SOVEREIGN: PRESENT JUDICIAL
REMEDIES AND THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The arsenal of those engaged in land title disputes is stocked with
many weapons--common-law and statutory, civil and criminal, ancient and modern. Although their details rapidly grow dim, the concepts of trespass, ejectment, bills of peace and bills quia timet are part
of the lore of lawyers, and they, or their contemporary counterparts,
exist in all states. The choice between these remedies in private land
disputes is principally determined by the relief desired-recovery of
possession, damages or declaratory relief. I4 Regardless of the nature
of the relief sought, however, one transcendent obstacle faces an aggrieved party when the land title dispute is with the United States: the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that the United
States, as sovereign, may not be sued without its consent.' 5 Since the
sory interest in land that is 'mineral in character."' Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U.S.

334, 335 (1963), quoting Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 456 (1920). The initial
determination of the validity of which, however, has been entrusted to the Department of
Interior, 371 U.S. at 336, and until such determination, and perfection by issuance of a patent,
legal title remains in the United States. 252 U.S. at 459-60. See United States v. Delta Dev.
Co., 322 F. Supp. 121, 128 (E.D. La. 1970).
14. Later in this article, some specifics of the remedies available in private land disputes
are briefly set out. See notes 140-55 infra and accompanying text. The variation in details from
state to state, of course, is great.
15. The scope of the doctrine in its fullest flower was set forth in Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571 (1934) as follows:
[C]onsent to sue the United States is a privilege accorded; not the grant of a property
right protected by the Fifth Amendment. The consent may be withdrawn, although given
after much deliberation and for a pecuniary consideration [citations omitted]. The sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or the source
of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to causes of action arising under acts
of Congress [citations omitted] and to those arising from some violation of rights conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution [citations omitted]. The character of the cause
of action-the fact that it is in contract as distinguished from tort-may be important
in determining (as under the Tucker Act) whether consent to sue was given. Otherwise,
it is of no significance. For immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty which may
not be bartered away. Id. at 581-82.
For the latest Supreme Court addition to the endless stream of citation to sovereign immunity, see Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1967). See also United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 767 (1941). An outstanding discussion of the subject area, with an analysis of its application to land disputes as to which this article is singularly indebted, appears in Cramton. See
also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.01 (1959); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 6 (1965); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal 'Nonstatutory' Judicial

Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479

(1962). A long listing of scholarly output on the subject may be found in Scalia, supra note 13,
at 867 n.l.
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immunity is viewed as a defect affecting the subject matter jurisdiction

of federal courts, federal officers or attorneys cannot confer jurisdiction by purporting to waive the sovereign's immunity-that is a power
enjoyed only by the Congress.'

The rationale for this purely technical defense has been shifting
and unclear. The handiest shibboleth in its support has been that "the
king can do no wrong," with the United States now sitting on the

sovereign's throne17-although

this, of course, expresses a result, not

a reason. The only rationale presently accorded any degree of respect

is that official actions of the government require protection from
undue judicial interference.' Regardless of its justification, however,
the doctrine has enjoyed a general applicability which has prevented
suits against the United States eo nonine, except as authorized by

Congress. Such a draconian doctrine, of course, has resulted in various procedural devices to circumvent its harsher features-for example, the "officer suit," which indulges the fiction that the doctrine
does not apply, in certain circumstances, when suit is brought against
an individual government officer or employee, rather than the United

States. 9 There are, in addition, several major statutory measures
which ameliorate the impact of the doctrine. These include, notably,

the Tucker Act, waiving sovereign immunity as to contracts,20 and the
16. See, e.g.. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1939); Case v. Terrell, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 199 (1871).
17. Another has been that
[t]he reasons for this immunity are imbedded in our legal philosophy. They partake
somewhat of dignity and decorum, somewhat of practical administration, somewhat of
the political desirability of an impregnable legal citadel where government as distinct
from its functionaries may operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants. A sense of
justice has brought a progressive relaxation by legislative enactments of the rigor of the
immunity rule. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940). Cf. Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
18. See Cramton 397.
19. See the authorities cited in note 15 supra. See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). At least where land title disputes
are involved, it appears that such "officer suits" will only lie where the officer's action "is not
within the officer's statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their
exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void." Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643,
647 (1962); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702 (1949). Whether this is
necessarily the case where the dispute involves the public land laws of the United States will be
subsequently discussed. See notes 55-61 infra and accompanying text.
20. The Tucker Act, Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, has since been amended,
and now appears in various sections of the United States Code. Its principal provisions are in
28 U.S.C. § 1491, 1346(a)(2) (1970). Actually, the waiver as to contract disputes was first
granted in 1855 by the establishment of the Court of Claims with advisory powers to the
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Federal Tort Claims Act, waiving the immunity as to torts (albeit,
in both cases, with some limitations). In a number of other areas,
22
however, the doctrine continues to be applied in full force.
This much discussed and criticized doctrine will not be explored
in any great detail, inasmuch as that task has already been ably
accomplished by numerous scholars, who have exhaustively chronicled its various twists and turns.2 Since, however, application of the
Congress. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 22, 10 Stat. 612. The history of the Court of Claims is
extensively reviewed in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1967). The Tucker Act also
waives sovereign immunity in several other types of claims against the United States, such as
those "founded. . . upon the Constitution."
21. The Federal Tort Claims Act enacted in the Legislative Reorganization Act of Aug. 2,
1946, ch. 753, §§ 401-24, 60 Stat. 812, 842, is also presently scattered throughout the Code,
with its major provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). A number of torts, however, are
excluded. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970). An exhaustive review of the FTCA and its provisions
may be found in JAYsON. For a handy discussion of both the Tucker Act and the FTCA, see
SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT.
22. Some of the latest examples of sovereign immunity at work are Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d
1348 (5th Cir. 1971) (denial of review of Civil Service Commission determination of no racial
discrimination in hiring practice of the Army Corps of Engineers); County of Bonner v. Anderson, 439 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1971) (dismissal of title dispute with the United States); Zapata v.
Smith, 437 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1971) (dismissal of suit for back pay on account of allegedly
unconstitutional dismissal of VISTA volunteers, although the court does note that the case
could have been brought against the United States in the Court of Claims or district court under
the Tucker Act). See generally Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1971, 1972
DuKE L.J. 115, 233-52.
23. See note 15 supra. Perhaps the most virulent of the recent attacks is Davis, Sovereign
Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383 (1970). He criticizes sovereign immunity as a doctrine
that "(I) often causes substantive injustice, (2) frequently results in final determinations without
the safeguards necessary for procedural justice and (3) causes gross inefficiency in the allocation
of functions between the officers and agencies, by preventing courts from resolving controversies
they are especially qualified to resolve." Id. There is also a belief that executive department
officials simply tend to act more carefully when they know their actions are subject to a second
look. See Hearings on Sovereign Immunity 45. As applied to land title disputes, however, the
full import of these considerations is relevant only where no Tucker Act relief is available.
Where Tucker Act relief is not available, the claimant is unable to get clear title, and the
determination of the issue of ownership can be made by an administrative officer without
evidence, cross-examination, oral argument, briefs or an impartial tribunal. In addition, executive department officials, rather than the courts, decide issues of property law and statutory
interpretation, which are functions courts are supremely equipped to handle. Based upon such
criticism, some feel a need to do away with the doctrine entirely. The House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association in February, 1970, adopted in principle a proposal to abolish
nearly all remnants of the doctrine in the federal courts. See Hearings on Sovereign Immunity
55-60. One of the early recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States
was along the same lines. See note 281 infra and accompanying text. A bill to amend § 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), to accomplish such a general waiver
of sovereign immunity was introduced in the 91st Congress, 2d Session, at S. 3568, and hearings
were held on the bill on June 3, 1970. No action was taken on the bill. It was reintroduced as
S. 598 in the 91st Congress.
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doctrine in the area of land-disputes causes considerable difficulty, a
brief historical review will be necessary. It is plain that the doctrine
bari the typical quiet title action directly against the United States
as such. 4 The issue through the years has been whether a more or less
equivalent result could be achieved by proceeding personally against
an officer or agent of the United States, such as in an action of
ejectment to regain possession of the disputed land.
Malone v. Bowdoin: The Door Seems to Close on Specific Relief
From Lee to Malone. In 1959 Buford Malone, Jr. was a Forest
Service ranger in charge and in possession of a tract of land located
in Jasper County, Georgia. The land had been purchased by the
United States in 1936, at which time it was thought that the land was
being acquired in fee simple ownership. In 1959 an ejectment action
was brought by James A. Bowdoin and others against Malone, alleging that the interest obtained by the United States in 1936 was only
the life interest of one Martha A. Sanders, and that plaintiffs, as
successors to the interests of the remaindermen, were entitled to possession of the property. The United States pled sovereign immunity-that is, that a suit against an individual which is in effect a suit
against the United States is subject to dismissal on that ground.
Although the district court dismissed on the sovereign immunity
ground,2 the Fifth Circuit reversed,"6 reasoning that ejectment, under
Georgia law, involved possession and not title, and that it was bound
by the long-standing decision of United States v. Lee. 2 Lee involved
a plot of land which had come into the possession of the United States
as a result -of a default in the payment of taxes. Action had been
brought in ejectment against the individuals occupying the land on
behalf of the United States, upon the allegation that the proffered
payment of taxes had been wrongfully refused. On these facts, the
Supreme Court held that where the agent of the United States is
tortiously and wrongfully holding possession of property which is in
fact owned by the private claimant, the doctrine of sovereign immunity will not protect the agent from an action for specific relief.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 242 (1960); Ward v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963).
25. 186 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
26. 284 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960), rehearing denied, 287 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369
U.S. 643 (1962).
27. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
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When Malone reached the Supreme Court it, in turn, reversed the
Fifth Circuit.2 8 The Court considered the case to fall within the cate-

gory of suits against government agents specifically affecting property
in which the United States claimed an interest,2 but observed that a
number of cases had denied relief under similar circumstances on the
ground of sovereign immunity. 31 In so ruling, the Court chose to
follow its holding in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,31 which involved a suit against the War Assets Administrator for specific performance of a contract for the sale of personalty, based upon the passage of title to the plaintiff buyer from the
United States. In upholding the United States' defense of sovereign

immunity, the Court in Larson postulated the rule that the action of
a federal officer affecting property claimed by a plaintiff can be made

the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual
only if his action exceeded his statutory powers or if the exercise of
these powers in the particular case was constitutionally void. 32 The

action of construing the contract and refusing delivery, the Court
held, was within the statutory powers of the War Assets Administra-

tor and, since there was no claim of an unconstitutional taking, the
action must fail as an attempt to enjoin the sovereign. 33 The Court in

Malone distinguished Lee, as it had in Larson, as a situation involving
an unconstitutional taking of property, since at that time no monetary
28. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
29. As the Court acknowledged, in the years following Lee, its principles had been applied
in a number of cases in a variety of factual situations. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643,
646 n.6 (1962). One of the most notable was Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947), decided only
two years prior to Larson. There plaintiffs were attempting to recover the shares of stock which
they alleged had been pledged as collateral for a debt which had been paid. The United States
alleged that the stock had in fact been transferred outright. The Supreme Court analyzed the
claim as resting on the common law right of pledgors to recover pledged property on payment
of the debt. In following and approving Lee, the defense of sovereign immunity was rejected.
Id. at 737.
30. 369 U.S. at 646 n.7. It also acknowledged that an attempt "to reconcile completely all
the decisions of the Court in this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task." Id. at 646.
31. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
32. Id. at 701-02. The doctrine clothing the possessor with the immunity of the sovereign is
not limited to cases where the United States itself has the right of possession. Even prior to
Malone, it was declared as settled that title to land in possession of the United States under a
claim of interest cannot be tried as against the United States by a suit against persons holding
as lessees from it. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 226 (1957). See also
Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1968); Ward v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 321 F.2d
775 (5th Cir. 1963).
33. 337 U.S. at 703.
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relief was available. Today. it was noted, damages for a taking of
property actually owned by the plaintiff could be obtained by a suit
in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. 31 Since in Malone there
was neither an unconstitutional taking nor any allegation that the
defendant had exceeded his statutory powers, the two exceptions to
the immunity doctrine articulated by the Court in Larson were not
applicable.
The aftermath of Malone. Malone v. Bowdoin is, of course, the
law of the land in land title dispute cases 35 and although plaintiffs
keep knocking, it seems to close the door upon specific relief.30 The
question, then, is whether anything remains of the Lee rule that sovereign immunity will not immunize the wrongful holding of property
owned, in fact, by a private party 37-that is, do any possibilities remain for specific relief in land title disputes with the United States?
Three faint shreds of hope for plaintiffs do seem extant.
(1) Acts of the sovereign's agent whici exceed his authority. The
Ninth Circuit appears to be in the process of developing a theory
which, if pursued, could on occasion neatly circumvent the holding
34. See notes 77-87 infra and accompanying text.
35. Indeed, the holding was reaffirmed in the very next year in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S.
609 (1963), which involved the taking of water rights by the United States without compensation; plaintiffs sought an injunction against diversion of river water. The Court dismissed the
action since no waiver of immunity had occurred and dismissed the suit against the federal
officers since it did not involve actions which either exceeded statutory power or were constitutionally void. The Court held that the United States was empowered to acquire the water rights
by physical seizure rather than formal condemnation. In yet a third case, Hawaii v. Gordon,
373 U.S. 57 (1963), the doctrine was also applied to an original action by the State of Hawaii
against the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to require a determination of whether certain
land was needed by the United States and, if not, to require its conveyance to Hawaii, Malone,
Dugan and Gordon tend to be discussed and cited as a trio. For an analysis of Malone in context
of the other cases, see Roarty, Lee, Land, Larson and Malone-Sovereign Immunity Revisited,
43 TEx. L. REv. 1062 (1965).
36. This lack of specific relief is made clear by two cases which recently arose in the Fifth
Circuit. In one, Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968), a
suit to quiet title to a tract of land, apparently valuable for its oil rights, formed by accretion
along a river which formed the boundary between land owned by the United States and land
owned by plaintiffs, was dismissed because of sovereign immunity. Similarly, in Gardner v.
Harris, 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968), the plaintiffs predecessor in interest had sold the United
States a tract of land which became part of a parkway. The conveyance had been subject to an
access easement, but the federal officer in charge of the parkway erected barricades across the
right-of-way. In an injunction suit seeking removal of the barricades, it was held that sovereign
immunity barred the action. See also Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Ward v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963);
Mims v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Va. 1971).
37. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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in Malone. An early hint of the development of the doctrine was the
refusal in Turner v. Kings River Conservation District3s to adopt the
alleged Larson rule that suit may not be maintained against government officers even for unauthorized or unconstitutional acts if the
relief would "expend itself upon the property of the United States"
or would "require affirmative action by the sovereign. ' 39 Rather, it
read Dugan v. Rank to allow such suits where the action could be
shown to have been unauthorized or unconstitutional," and then proceeded to examine in detail whether the relevant statute authorized the
disputed taking by the federal defendants of plaintiffs' alleged water
rights.
Subsequently in Andros v. Rupp4 2 the court espoused a rather
curious doctrine which would apparently look to the individual or
entity in whom record title is vested. In Rupp the United States was
asserting a right to manage plaintiff's land as if it were part of the
national forest. Plaintiff, who was conceded to have a valid patent,
brought the action to enjoin the defendant, supervisor of the national
forest within which plaintiffs land lay, from interfering with his use
and enjoyment of his land. The court held that since title was admittedly in the plaintiff, the defendant had no statutory power to control
the property. Larson and Malone were distinguished as cases where
record title was in the sovereign. Furthermore, the court said, statu38. 360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966).
39. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.l 1 (1949). In this
famous footnote 11, the Larson Court said that "[o]f course a suit may fail, as one against the
sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond
his statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation
of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property." In Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.
1969), the court read the footnote as permissive, rather than mandatory, suggesting only that
in such circumstances, the suit might be dismissed "because the relief sought would work an
intolerable burden on governmental functions, outweighing any consideration of private harm."
Id. at 1318. But cf Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1971).
40. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
41. 360 F.2d at 189-90. This holding was reaffirmed more recently in Washington v. Udall,
417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969), where the court was again willing to examine whether the
Secretary of the Interior had exceeded his statutory authority in determining that a 160-acre
limitation on land entitled to water from reclamation projects applied to state-owned
land-although a vigorous dissent contended the court was gutting Malone. Actually, the case
represents one of the few examples of serious consideration by a court of the possible application
of the Larson-Malone doctrine to a case involving an administrative denial of alleged private
rights to receive federal property. See note 13 supra. See also the cases cited in note 49 infra.
42. 433 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1970).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972:15

tory authority need not be cited by the plaintiff to show that the
defendant had exceeded his powers, for "we know of no statute saying
that a government official shall not take private property;" indeed,
"the defendant as a supervisor of property belonging to the United
States does not, by definition, have authority to control property
which does not belong to the United States. 41 3 This view was reaffirmed in Armstrong v. Udall,4 which involved the question of
whether a parcel of land was included in a United States patent. The
case was remanded, significantly, for a specific finding of whether the
parcel had been included within the patent. If so, the court said that,
under.Andros, the action would lie; if not, "then the apparent title
would be in the United States and the action is one against the United
States without its consent," which would be barred by Malone.
The root question in these cases appears to be the determination
of when a federal official is exceeding his statutory powers, subjecting
himself to suit without the cloak of sovereign immunity. Although the
argument may logically be made that an officer is not authorized to
possess that which the sovereign does not own, Larson seems to have
expressly considered and rejected this approach. There it was held that
the defendant's statutory authority included the power to construe
contracts and to withhold delivery in cases where he believed the
contract had not been complied with-that is, simply because his
construction may have been wrong, it does not follow that it was
unauthorized." Though subjected to biting criticism, the distinction
between "error" and "authority" seems to have been accepted." It
would appear from Larson that if the officer were a private agent and
if the government were a "principal," the action would be within the
"authority" of the officer if the government would be liable for his
acts.47
The fact of the matter, however, is that this issue has not been fully
tested in land dispute cases. In Malone, no allegation was even made
that Malone exceeded his delegated powers in occupying the land in
43. Id. at 72.
44. 435 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1970).
45. 337 U.S. at 703.
46. See Cramton 406-08, 412-14; Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv.,supra note 13, at 1222-23.
47. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 692-95 (1949), Cf.
Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965)
(blocking of alleged easement); Hudspeth City, County & Reclamation Dist. v. Robbins, 213
F.2d 425,432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954) (allegedly vested water rights).
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question. In Dugan, the seizure of the water rights was found to be
authorized by statute, and, indeed, by specifically deciding the issue,
the court was by implication suggesting that if such authority had not
existed, the action against the officers individually would lie within the
Larson exception. s
Andros and Armstrong may show the way to relief in some circumstances. They appear to stand for the proposition that while
plaintiff will never be able to show a limiting statute expressly prohibiting defendant from interfering with land not owned by the sovereign,
it may be presumed that at least where record, or even colorable, title
is vested in the plaintiff, defendant will be exceeding his authority in
taking possession of the property unless affirmative statutory authorization to do so can be shown. Indeed, it would not untenably stretch
the point to limit Malone to cases where there is no allegation of
colorable merit that the government officer acted beyond his authority, 9 particularly where the act complained of did not occur upon
48. It is true that lower court cases such as Simons and Gardner have had this argument
presented to them, but the plaintiffs in those cases seem in part to have been blocked by the
requirement in Larson that "plaintiff set out in his complaint the statutory limitation upon
which he relies." 337 U.S. at 690. In Simons, the dilemma was recognized and plaintiffs alleged
that dealing with the disputed land was beyond the Secretary's authority since the United States
did not in fact own it. The court labeled the argument "circuitous" because it assumed the
ultimate issue, which the court said must "necessarily" be established by a suit against the
United States. 394 F.2d at 737. As the dissent noted, id., the latter assertion seems erroneous
in that the relief sought by the plaintiff was in essence to gain control over the land, which, as
in Lee, could be attained by successful action against the federal officers. In Gardner, the court
found authority in the statutes for the defendant to administer and maintain the parkway, and
the act complained of, blocking plaintiff's alleged easement, occurred on the parkway property
of the federal government. 391 F.2d at 888. The case is, thus, distinguishable from a situation
in which the acts complained of occurred off of clearly federal property.
49. The suggestion that a clearly public act by a federal officer was "unauthorized" worked
in Zager v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Wis. 1966). There the Bureau of Land
Management had resurveyed the property in dispute (32 acres), determined that it belonged to
the United States, and taken possession. In a quiet title action, the court held that since the
plaintiff had alleged that the resurvey was beyond the delegated authority of the federal officials,
the action would not be dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity presumably because, for
jurisdictional purposes, averments in the complaint will be accepted at face value, unless frivolous. Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1969). See Smith v. Katzenbach. 351
F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965). One other land title case to the same effect is Blask v. Sowl,
309 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Wis. 1967). For other recent cases not involving title disputes, which
depart from the strict Larson rule, see Rockridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1971)
(unauthorized non-action); Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1971) ("[T]here is no magic about real estate, or its ownership by the United States, which
hedges its guardians about with an immunity.").
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unquestionably federal property."
(2) Unconstitutional acts-those with no "public use." In rare

circumstances, it is conceivable that even if the federal officer's action
is "authorized, ' 51 it may be held to exceed the sovereign's constitutional powers.5 2 Such a case might arise, for example, where a taking
would not be constitutionally authorized because no "public use" was
involved.5 3 It has been intimated that under these circumstances an

action for specific relief would be permitted, presumably because of
50. In United States v. 2005.32 Acres of Land, 160 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1958), a district
court held that the Secretary of the Army had no statutory power to condemn certain tribal
lands. On appeal the judgment was vacated and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss
as moot. 259 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1958). It has also been held on the district court level that failure
to comply with the requirements of the statute would be a good defense to the condemnation.
United States v. 37.6 Acres of Land, 126 F. Supp. 789 (D. Conn. 1954); cf. United States v.
10.69 Acres of Land, 425 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1970) (Department of Transportation attempted
to condemn land held by another department of the government: appropriate administrative
procedures must be complied with).
51. Rarely has the condemnation of a particular property or property interest been voided
as beyond the statutory authority of an administrative officer. Where there is some statutory
basis for the action, the courts will only review it upon an allegation that the condemnation is
arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946). And
although various courts of appeals have said they would review such an action, no holding has
been found at that level that a condemnation allegedly pursuant to a valid statute was ultra vires
the officer's authority. See Chapman v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 367 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1966);
United States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Certain
Real Estate, 217 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 215 F.2d
140 (3d Cir. 1954); Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v.
Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940). The analysis used is that once the statute is held valid, it
is an administrative function to determine the particular properties necessary to carry out the
legislative program; the courts will not second guess the executive branch. See United States v.
80.5 Acres of Land, 448 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1971).
52. For the classic example of specific relief against a totally unauthorized appropriation
of property by the executive branch, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
"53. U.S. CONsT. amend V. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Puerto Rico v.
Eastern Sugar Ass'n, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946). It should be
noted that the Supreme Court has never invalidated a taking by a federal agency for the reason
that the particular project lacked a public use-apparently because a government of enumerated
powers acts for a public use if the act is for an object within the authority of Congress. See
PLLRC Committee Print No. 31, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-53 (1965). Cf Comment, The Public
Use Doctrineon Eminent Domain:An Advance Requiem. 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
There have been a few instances at lower court levels where the statute pursuant to which
condemnations were made was held unconstitutional as serving no public purpose. United States
v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 296 U.S. 567 (1935),
petitionfor cert. dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936); United States v. Certain Lands in Detroit, 12
F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1935).
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the unconstitutionality of the action.54 An unconstitutional taking
may even have occurred in the Simons case-where the dispute apparently arbse because of the existence of oil on the property-since the
United States could not, presumably, have exercised its power of
eminent domain to acquire the property in the absence of an established public purpose or constitutional function.
(3) Public land law decisions. Finally, mention should be made
of the inapplicability of Malone to disputes involving administrative
decisions under the public land laws. Such cases, a somewhat disparate class from those generally involved in this article,55 typically do
not involve questions of title, but rather are attempts to obtain judicial
review of administrative decisions principally involving refusals to

grant a plaintiff rights in public lands or cancellations thereof as
authorized by law.56 An exhaustive recent study57 has demonstrated

that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has in practice presented little
problem in this class of case, either before or after the Larson and
Malone decisions.5 8 However, a few post-Malone decisions essentially
54. See Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1316 n.8 (1969). But cf Knight v. United
States, 443 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1971), where the court refused to order the return of property
allegedly taken for a non-public use in violation of the Constitution-reading footnote 11 of
Larson broadly to preclude such action. See note 39 supra.
55. See notes 13 supra and 61 infra.
56. A recent example in the Supreme Court is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), where
the issue was the rightfulness of a denial by the Secretary of the Interior of an oil and gas lease
to plaintiffs, to which they claimed they were entitled under the relevant statute. Mandamus
was sought to compel the issuance of the lease. Without mentioning sovereign immunity, the
Court undertook a careful analysis of the underlying legal issue-the interpretation of the
relevant statute.
57. Scalia, 68 MIcH. L. REv., supra note 13.
58. The article analyzes the cases in detail. Id. at 910-11. The principal problems are the
familiar ones in review of administrative actions such as standing, jurisdiction, joinder, ripeness,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the scope of review. See Comment, 68 MICH. L.
REv., supra note 13, at 1220-43. To the extent that sovereign immunity remains a difficulty,
the recent study of such judicial review of administrative action by the consultant for the
PLLRC proposes a "simple statutory affirmation of the right to court review," although
recognizing other problems might exist. C. McFARLAND, supra note 13, at 305. The proposed
amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, discussed at note 281 infra and accompanying
text, should constitute an effective waiver of sovereign immunity as to such cases, or, if such
action is unavailing, expansion of the statute herein proposed could be considered. But see note
252 infra. An occasional report does appear in which the Malone doctrine will be carried over
to this class of case. See Colson v. Hickel, 428 F.2d 1046 (1970), involving a determination by
the Secretary of the invalidity of scrip held by plaintiff, who asserted that by virtue thereof he
was entitled to select a certain amount of federal land; the court dismissed the action on the
basis of sovereign immunity. Concern over such instances was sufficient to cause the PLLRC
consultant to comment that in this area the "precedents baffle lawyers, tempt government
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appearing to be disputes over title have collaterally involved the interpretation of the public land laws and regulations, and the application
of the sovereign immunity doctrine has been uneven. In Brennan v.
Udall,5 1 for example, the issue involved the scope of a reservation of
oil and gas rights in a patent issued to plaintiffs predecessor in interest. The court rejected the defense of sovereign immunity and proceeded to review the extent of the reserved interest. On the other hand.
in Ward v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,60 the plaintiff claimed a valid
title through a patent by the United States to Mississippi under the
Swamp Lands Act, and the court dismissed the action on the basis
of Malone. It may simply be said that the long-standing tradition of
judicial review of such administrative decisions may be sufficient in a
given land title dispute involving a public-land law interpretation to
overcome the impact of the Malone doctrine, particularly if the issue
can be framed in terms of a review of an administrative decision. 6
counsel, and feed the despair of commentators." C. MCFARLAND, supra, at 188. Hawaii v.
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963), might also be considered a "public land law" case in this category,
but is probably more accurately viewed as falling within the narrow category of original land
actions by states in the Supreme Court, as to which the application of sovereign immunity has
been the rule. See Scalia, supra, at 910 n.209.
59. 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967). See also California Co. v.
Udall, 296 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
60. 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963). The plaintiff's demand was that the Secretary cancel leases
to third persons on the ground that the lease' clouded the title to the disputed land. As Professor
Scalia points out, the case does not have the "smell" of a typical public land law case, as "the
essence of the plaintiff's grievance was not that officers had denied him a grant to which he
was entitled, but rather that they were interfering with land which he already owned." Scalia,
68 MICH. L. REV., supra note 13, at 912 n.212. Cf. Seifert v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 443
(D. Mont. 1968).
61. In Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967), for
example, the court characterized the action as a review of a decision by the executive branch
authorized by the APA, and followed the rule of determining the reasonableness of the interpretation of the relevant statute. Id. at 806.
While this analysis shows how the two classes of cases differ, it of course does not explain
why they should differ, nor have the courts expressly recognized any distinction. History alone
serves as one explanation. Indeed, the concept that courts will not hesitate to issue mandamus
orders to require the disposal of public land, but will refuse to interfere on the grounds of
sovereign immunity when the only issue is whether the land is the sovereign's in the first place
seems convoluted. One distinction, however, may be drawn-resting on the underlying thesis
that sovereign immunity is designed to prevent an unacceptable judicial interference with executive branch actions. Where the executive branch determination case deals with some aspect of
the management or disposal of public land, the executive branch has already made a determination that something will be done with it, and judicial participation in the carrying out of that
determination does not seem a particularly severe interference. In a land title dispute, however,
it may well be that the executive branch activity bears no relation to its role as a disposer of
public land. That is to say, the property occupied by the sovereign may be used as a fort, office
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Alternatives to Specific Relief

What then, with Malone on the books, is the private party in a
land title dispute with the United States to do? There may be alternatives available, even if the picture now facing the land disputant is, to
say the least, often dismal. A discussion of these possible alternatives
is necessary to frame the setting within which statutory reform must
fit.
Existing waivers for specific relief Although the sovereign may

not be sued without its consent, it can consent. There is nothing in
the property field equivalent to the near-blanket waivers which exist
for contract and tort disputes 6 2 but efforts to 'obtain a statutory
waiver permitting specific relief in disputes over certain land interests
have been successful in three areas. The first occurred in 1931 in the
area of mortgages and liens. Here, the Congress said that the United
building, national forest or in connection with a myriad of other governmental activities unrelated to its land management function. In such circumstances, the courts by disposing of the
ultimate ownership issue may be much more likely to directly interfere with governmental action
wholly unrelated to that of managing land. Another unarticulated distinction may well be that
in the garden-variety dispute, when sovereign immunity is applied, at least compensation for
the challenged governmental seizure of property can be achieved under the Tucker Act. In the
public-land cases involving challenges to administrative determinations, a denial of judicial
review will leave the claimant totally uncompensated.
62. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), provides
that "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
On its face, this would appear to be a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity as to actions within
the APA. In Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1953), however, the Court indicated that the
Act was not to be construed as such an implied waiver of all governmental immunity from suit,
and a number of lower courts have specifically so held. See Cramton 417 n.143; Scalia, 68
MIcH. L. REV., supra note 13, at 923 n.249. In Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859,
873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found it "axiomatic" that the section constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity, citing cases from the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
However, in Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971), the court reviewed Scanwell and
the cases on which it relied, noted that they had been later modified or overruled, and concluded
that the waiver theory could not be sustained. This certainly is the suggestion of the several
Supreme Court cases in the property dispute field between 1946 (the adoption of the APA) and
1964 which applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity with no mention of the APA. Even if
the section should be heldeffective as a waiver, difficult questions are raised as to what constitutes "agency action" thereunder in the title dispute field. See Note, Administrative Delay and
Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1423 (1968); Note, Judicial Control of Administrative Inaction, 57 U. VA. L. REV. 676 (1971); cf. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1971).
Problems would exist in subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp.,
280 U.S. 500 (1930); In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956);
Cramton 448.
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States may be sued in any federal district court, or in any state court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter, to quiet title to. to foreclose

a mortgage or other lien upon, to partition, or to condemn real or
personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.13 Though it does provide a number of protective
provisions-such as a requirement for judicial sale and a one-year
mandatory right to redeem" 4-the waiver can provide effective specific
relief where the interest of the United States is in the nature of a lien."
From the reported cases, the section has been much used. However,
attempts to persuade the courts to stretch the provision to cover
disputes over other types of disputed titles have failed." This is not
surprising when it is recalled that acts of Congress waiving sovereign
immunity are to be strictly construed, and exceptions not to be im-

plied .17
The strictness of this prohibition may be observed in the second
area in which statutory waiver exists-namely. in actions for partition, where the United States is one of the tenants in common or a
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1970). The proponents of the legislation noted a clamor on the part
of building associations and title and trust companies over the inability to unfetter real property
from "oppressive and unendurable" government liens. See 72 CONG. REC. 1998 (1930). The
United States was said to have its status the same as any other second-lien creditor, citizen, or
corporation, and it should be put in no different a position. Id. at 3120. Thus the purpose of
section 2410 was essentially to provide relief for mortgagees and other creditors rather than to
relieve property holders in general.
However, the policy behind section 2410 seems also to militate for relief in the situations
discussed in this article. The essence of the legislation was best described in the Senate report
of the bill: The Government ought not to desire to occupy a dog-in-the-manger position with
respect to its liens, neither taking steps to enforce them nor permitting others interested to test
their validity or priority. S. REP. No. 351, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). Again, when the "quiet
title" language was added in 1942, Attorney General Robert Jackson wrote to the Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee: "It appears that justice and fair dealing would require that
a method be provided to clear real estate titles of questionable or valueless Government liens."
H. R. REP. No. 1191, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1970).
65. Some additional provisions relating specifically to tax liens and their enforcement appear in 26 U.S.C. §§ 7424-26 (1970).
66. Stewart v. United States, 242 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957) (mineral rights); Haggard v.
Lancaster, 320 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Minn. 1970) (right of way); see, e.g., Zager v. United
States, 256 F. Supp. 396, 398 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
67. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270,
276 (1957). But cf.the generous reading of the waiver statute relating to water rights in United
States v. District Ct. in & for County of Eagle, Colo., 401 U.S. 520 (1971); United States v.
District Ct. in & for Water Div. No. 5,401 U.S. 527 (1971); De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v.
United States, 451 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1971) ("any doubts as to its waiver [of sovereign
immunity] are to be resolved against the sovereign").
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joint tenant."' The statute provides plainly that the action "shall proceed, and be determined, in the same manner as would a similar
action between private persons." 69 Efforts have been made to persuade the courts that these provisions constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity extending to cases where the very existence of the cotenancy
is challenged by the United States. The few appellate cases on the
point have held, however, that unless the title of the private claimant
70
in the cotenancy is "clear and uncontroverted," no action will lie.
The only area involving property interests where the United States
has consented to adjudications of full ownership is that of water
rights. The waiver permits joinder of the United States as defendant
in any suit for the adjudication of water rights. 7' Although not all such
disputes fall within the statute 72 the existence of this waiver provision
is significant. 73 and it can impose a considerable litigation burden
upon the United States. 74 Absent a case involving a mortgage or other
lien, partition or water rights, however, the claimant must look to
other relief-first and foremost, the possibility of damages.
Damages. If sovereign immunity were absolute, no relief could be
obtained from the sovereign. There exists, however, one additional
area of waiver which in effect gives the land claimant a remedy in the
form of damages in certain cases. While, of course, such a remedy is
not the traditional one in land dispute cases 75 its availability provides
a significant amelioration to an otherwise intolerable situation. Thus,
68. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 2409 (1970).
69. Id. § 2409.
70. Stanton v. United States, 434 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1970); Rambo v. United States,
145 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 848 (1945). Historically, it was noted, the
equity court's jurisdiction over partition actions did not include questions of controverted title.
Id. at 671. See also Jones v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
71. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). It provides that the United States shall be subject to the
judgment of the courts "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances" except that no costs shall be entered. See Green River Adjudication v.
United States, 17 Utah 2d 50,404 P.2d 251 (1965).
72. In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), the statute was construed to permit joinder of
the United States only where the law suit sought a general adjudication of rights in waters and
not just to determine the priority of the claimants' rights vis-a-vis the United States. For full
discussion, see State v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1961). In United States v. District
Ct., 401 U.S. 520 (1971), the definition of a "general adjudication" is given a rather generous
reading.
73. Under the statute, the United States waives any right to "plead that the state laws are
inapplicable." 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970).
74. See United States v. District Ct., 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
75. See notes 156-67 infra and accompanying text.
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in a number of circumstances, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity in land title dispute cases, but limited the remedy to
damages. Indeed, the Malone decision has been supported by respected authority on the ground that "the United States may regulate
in a reasonable fashion suits against its officers," and that providing
damage compensation was just such regulation.76
(I) Compensation via the Tucker Act. By the Tucker Act,7 the
United States has waived its sovereign immunity in suits for breach
of contract, express or implied, and by amendment in actions founded
upon the Constitution.78 It was, therefore, an easy step to permit
private claimants whose properties were taken without formal eminent domain proceedings to bring suit for damages under the Tucker
Act on the basis of an implied promise by the United States to pay
compensation.7 9 Where the government took under a claim of title,
however, no such promise could be fictionalized and no remedy was
available."
The doctrinal breakthrough came in United Stat's v. Causby 1
which involved frequent and regular flights of military aircraft over
plaintiffs' land at low altitudes. In upholding plaintiffs' right to recover compensation under the Tucker Act, the Court noted that it was
unnecessary to decide whether the repeated trespasses gave rise to an
implied contract. If there is a taking, the claim is "founded upon the
Constitution," and thus within -the scope of the sovereign immunity
waiver afforded by the Tucker Act.8 2 Sometimes referred to as "inverse condemnation, '" this same doctrine was relied upon in Malone
76. Jaffe, 77 HARV. L. REV., supra note 19, at 39.
77. See note 20 supra.
78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(21 1491 (1970). On the Tucker Act generally, see

SCtIWARTZ &

JACOBY. TEXT.

79. See -uley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
80. See. e.g., Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918); Hill v. United States, 149 U.S.
593 (1893); Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879).
81. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); Hill v. United
States, 149 U.S. 593, 600 (1893) (dissent).
82. The constitutional reference, of course, is to the provision prohibiting the taking of
private property fo\public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Sioux
Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 378 (C.. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963); St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 831 (Ct. CI. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 815 (1948).
83. A recent discussion of "inverse condemnation" is Pittle, Suits Against the U.S. for
Taking Property Without Just Compensation, 55 GEO. L.J. 631 (1967). See also Comment, 46
NEB. L. REv. 816 (1967); 44 A.B.A.J. 883 (1958).

-
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to support the decision that no specific relief was required where
damages were available., 4
Although the award by the Court of Claims is compensation
rather than damages, the net effect is similar-a forced sale of the
land interest by the private claimant to the United States, valued as
of the time of taking.- In property terms, it is the equivalent of the
award given to a plaintiff in an action for personal property when the
specific property itself cannot be found-that is, damages equal to the
value of the property. 6 The nonexistence of a private law equivalent
in the real property area is, presumably. due to the fact that real
property can always be found and returned in specie.
However, such compensation is often unavailable in land title
disputes. The most significant limitation is that the United States
must have exerted itself to the extent of asserting possession or use
sufficient to constitute a constitutional taking. Where such a taking
has not occurred, this avenue to a settlement of a land title dispute is
not open., 7
84. 369 U.S. at 647 n.8.In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), the court again held a
Tucker Act action sufficient where an uncompensated taking of property (the water rights) was
involved.
85. The measure of compensation is the full value of the property at the time of taking.
United States v. Herrero, 416 F.2d 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 973 (1969). The decree
granting compensation may recite a vesting in the United States, Wright v. United States, 279
F.2d 517, 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960), or require an actual conveyance. Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d
444, 449 (Ct. Cl. 1962). See notes 163-67 infra and accompanying text.
86. See K. YORK &J. BAUMAN, REMEDIES 385 (1967).
87. It may be speculated whether the mere assertion of a claim of ownership by the United
States in a land dispute might not be enough to constitute a "taking" upon which the private
disputant might bottom a Tucker Act action. However, the theory presents difficulties. If the
United States in fact owns the claimed property interest, no compensation is due. If it does not
own the claimed property interest, then under the Tucker Act theory of inverse condemnation,
plaintiff would be faced with the general rule that no right exists to compensation for exercise
of the right of eminent domain until the United States actually takes possession or title vests in
it, whichever first occurs, United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958), or at least some positive
action is begun to this end. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932). See also United States v.
Garlach Live Stock Co., 76 F. Supp. 87 (Ct. Cl. 1948), affd, 339 U.S. 725 (1950). While it is
true that the concept of a "taking of property" is an enlarging one where possession is increasingly ephemeral, see. e.g., Thornburg v. City of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Ore. 1962) (noise from
aircraft flying near, but not over, plaintiff's property may constitute "taking"); cf. United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Kent County, Mich., 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966),
and that under certain circumstances regulatory actions of the government short of acquisition
of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all
or most of his interest in the subject property, to amount to a "taking," see United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); R.J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d
988, 993 (Ct. Cl. 1966); cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), to find a "taking"
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(2) Compensation via the FTCA. The passage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 19468 opened another possible avenue for damage
relief in land title disputes by making available the ancient tort of
trespass. Prior to the FTCA, trespasses were noncompensable,8 although at some point repeated governmental trespasses had been acknowledged to ripen into a constitutional taking, which would justify
a Tucker Act case." Indeed, much of the history of the Tucker Act
reflects the influence of the lack of relief for torts committed by the
by mere verbal assertions by the government would push the concept beyond any prior limits.
But cf. State v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1961). Moreover, compensation is
normally not available for any reduction in land value brought about by the prospect of
condemnation; until the "taking," the United States may change its mind without liability.
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1939). But cf City of Cleveland v. Carcione,
190 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio App. 1963). Plaintiff's argument rests essentially on the theory that the
value of his land is diminished by the government's wrongful assertion of an ownership interest,
for which the usual remedy is a tort action for slander of title. However, under the FTCA,
actions for libel or slander are excluded, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970), and in any event a good
faith belief in one's claim and lack of malice seem a defense. W. PROSSER,'ToRTs 920-22, 92425 (4thed. 1971).
Likewise, in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for the six-year period
within which "inverse condemnation" actions must be brought under the Tucker Act, the
Supreme Court has held that the statute does not begin to run until the taking is complete.
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1961). The facts in that case involved the construction
of a dam, as a result of which plaintiff's land was eventually flooded by the backed-up waters.
The government's assertion was that the statute began to run when the dam began to impound
water or, at the latest, when the first portion of plaintiff's land was inundated. The Court on
the contrary stated that "property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made
upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been
acquired either by agreement or in course of time." Id. at 748. In this case, it held that the
statute did not begin to run until the "situation was stabilized"-that is, the extent of the
flooding was determined. Although the Court specifically reserved the question whether the
landowner might be allowed to bring suit as soon as inundation threatens, it would certainly
appear that the accrual of the statute of limitations should be coincident with the commencement of the existence of the cause of action as a general matter. The Court of Claims has phrased
the test as whether the government has "acquired effective control over the property." Cuban
Truck and Equipment Co. v. United States, 333 F.2d 873, 878 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
844 (1964). But cf. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. C 1.413 (1943)
(United States by statute declared all Ute lands to be "the absolute property of the United
States"; held, a taking).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
89. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 34 (1879).
90. The most famous case adopting this rule was Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
327 (1922), where, despite two prior appeals which had denied that the firing of guns over
plaintiff's property warranted recovery, Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 1 (1919), Mr. Justice Holmes
concluded that a sufficient number of successive firings could eventually ripen into a taking.
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sovereign.9" It is now. however, well-settled that a damage claim based
2
upon trespass to land or chattels is actionable under the FTCA.1
93
Thus, trespasses to land such as low-flying aircraft, the destruction
of trees by government agents94 and the deposit of mud and silt upon
plaintiff's land 9 5 have all been compensated under the FTCA.9 8
On the question of whether the FTCA route is available in a land
title dispute when a Tucker Act action would also lie, however, there
is a split of opinion. The issue assumes significance if, for example,
the plaintiff sought damages on the theory of a continuing trespass, 7
or if, where the claim exceeded $ 10,000, the plaintiff sought the more
familiar landscape of a federal district court in preference to the Court
of Claims-which is where such Tucker Act cases are brought.', In
Simons v. United States99 the actual dispute was over ownership of
land on which oil had been found. After the plaintiffs failed in an
action to recover possession on Malone sovereign immunity grounds,
they brought an action under the FTCA to recover damages, which
would be measured by the value of oil royalties produced. Notwithstanding the argument that the relief sought would adjudicate title
against the United States, the court permitted the trespass action."'0
91. See SCHWARTZ &JACOBY, TEXT ch. x.
92. JAYSON § 212.02, at 9-8. See also Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180-81
(1956). That is not to say, however, that one of the defenses under the Act may not be applicable,
such as the discretionary function exception.
93. Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962); Weisberg v. United States, 193
F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1951).
94. Kephart v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
95. Anderson v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
96. See also Robin Constr. Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1965). For a
discussion of taking vis-a-vis trespass, see NicHoLs § 6.11.
97. See, e.g., 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transp. Auth., 15 N.Y.2d 48, 203
N.E.2d 486 (1964). Trespass damages might exceed those available under the Tucker Act. See,
e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963). An intriguing collateral problem is
the degree to which a trespass action encompasses a wrongful withholding of possession as well
as wrongful dispossession in the first instance. See Roman v. Velarde, 428 F.2d 129, 132 n.5
(lst Cir. 1970); F. HARPER & F. JANiEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.7 (1956); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 162, comment c (1965). State law would be determinative. As to whether
proceedings for compensation for property condemned precludes an action for damages arising
from prior trespasses, see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1132 (1970).
98. See note 107 infra.
99. 413 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1969).
100. Id. at 533-34. The states are split on the question whether, in a trespass action, the
plaintiff may collect for all damages, past and future, on the basis of a permanent appropriation
of land. Some will allow damages for the trespass only. Others, however, have given the plaintiff
the right to permanent damages at his election, and by so doing he waives the invasion and

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972: 15

Roman v. Velarde,'0° which also involved a trespass action for damages against the United States under the FTCA, is in contrast to
Simons. In Velarde. the government had argued that it had not con-

sented in the FTCA to suit on a claim for trespass where the issue of
title was involved. Agreeing with that view, the court held that the
FTCA does not provide a forum for a plaintiff demanding compensation for land which had been permanently taken. In those circumstances only a Tucker Act action would be available.

2

1

This distinction

was based on the policy judgment that a trespass action remedied
wrongs which were limited in time and quality, whereas a Tucker Act

action would allow complete and final compensation for land permanently taken.103
Although the logic of Roman v. Velarde seems persuasive, its
difficulty lies in the murky distinction drawn between a trespass and
a constitutional taking. This is partly attributable to the historical
fact that the absence of any tort liability in the sovereign prior to 1946
led to a somewhat strained concept of how much action was necessary
to constitute a taking,'0 ' for in the title dispute area every act for
which a taking would lie would also constitute a treaspass. 15 Anomalous situations may, thus, develop. Relief may be unavailable under
the FTCA because of one of its numerous exceptions-for example,
a discretionary function-and yet be maintainable as an unconstituconsents to the continued occupancy of the land. Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 288
P.2d 507 (Cal. 1955); McCormick, DamagesforAnticipated Injury to Land, 37 HARM. L. REv.
574 (1924).
101. 428 F.2d 129 (lst Cir. 1970).
102. Id. at 132.
103. Id. at 133. Accord, Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963). Oddly, none
of the three cases cites the others.
104. See, e.g., Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922). Cf. United States v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
105. The nature of government action in certain types of "takings" often is analyzed on
the distinction between a valid exercise of the regulatory power, on the one hand, for which no
compenation need be paid, and acts which constitute a taking. See Abend, Federal Liability
for Takings and Torts: An Anomalous Relationship, 31 FORD. L. REV. 481,488-89 (1963); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). In the case at hand, however, the issue
is between a clear case of trespass and the permanence required for a taking. Cf. Gottlieb, The
Tort Claims Act Revisited, 49 GEo. L.J. 539, 573 (1961).
This uncertainty is evidence of the difficulty which is often experienced in determining the
extent of the estate taken. See generally United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); 5
NichoLs T 16.104. See also Pittle, Suits Against the United States for Taking Property
Without Just Compensation, 55 GEO. L.J. 631, 636 (1967), which asserts that prior to Malone,
injunctive or trespass relief would be allowed under Lee. Id. at 633.
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tional "taking."' 6 Apparently the crucial distinction is that to constitute a "taking" under the Tucker Act, the action of the government
must be sufficiently continuous and permanent as to constitute the
acquisition of a property interest.'1 7 Where a plaintiff is presented with
a potential dilemma because the permanence of the taking is in doubt,
an action in trespass under the FTCA commenced in the district
court may be transferred to the Court of Claims if necessary.,"
Action by the United States. While sovereign immunity protects
the United States as a defendant, it in no way limits it as a plaintiff.
If. therefore, the United States can be persuaded, induced or compelled to bring an action against the private claimant in which the
issue of land ownership is at stake, effective specific relief may be
obtained. In Malone, the government asserted that it is willing to
bring its own actions to quiet title "when substantial, reasonable, and
active claims may be asserted by private citizens." ' 9 In County of
Bonner v. Anderson,"' however, the Ninth Circuit followed Malone
and dismissed an action brought by the county to quiet title to some
disputed land, but declared in exasperation that
As a matter of policy, it seems a shame that the County of Bonner cannot
find a forum or a proper party to sue to test its claim to the land in question.
In other fields, the government has created the Court of Claims and the Federal
Tort Claims Act for its citizens.
We wonder why the government won't sue the County of Bonner, as it may,
to quiet title, rather than laughing at its contentions and saying, "If you have
a right, you can't vindicate it.""'
106. See, e.g., Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950) (FTCA held inapplicable); Coates v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 637, 639 (an unconstitutional "taking" found). See
also Abend, supra note 105, at 494-99.
107. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). See also Fromme v. United
States Victoria County Navigation Dist., 412 F.2d 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (no taking for occasional flooding); Finks v. United States, 395 F.2d 999 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960
(1968) (no taking where temporary seizure of property by United States); United States v. 40.60
Acres of Land, 324 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (no taking where condemnation of fee renders
easement useless); United States v. 967.905 Acres of Land, 305 F. Supp. 83 (D. Minn. 1969)
(taking); Lombardy v. Peter Kicwit Sons Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 599, 72 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 813 (1968) (no taking for noise, dirt and the like in freeway construction). Cf National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969) (no taking).
108. Roman v. Velarde, 428 F.2d 129, 133 (Ist Cir. 1970). The Court of Claims has
exclusive jurisdiction of Tucker Act actions where the amount involved exceeds $I0,000. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1970).
109. Transcript of Record, at 48.
110. 439 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1971).
I11. Id. See also Gardner v. Harris, 391 F.2d 885, 887 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
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This exasperation is not without foundation. Clearly the United
States is willing to bring quiet title actions in some circumstances,"'
but their pattern is difficult to discern.1 3 For the United States to
institute judicial relief actions"' as a matter of course where a dispute
exists, it appears that two criteria must exist.11 5 The first is that the
112. For very recent examples, see United States v. Severson, 447 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, __
U.S. (1972); United States v. MacMillan, 331 F. Supp. 435 (D. Nev.
1971); United States v. Buras, 332 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. La. 1970).
113. Quiet title and other real property actions have been brought by the United States
without jurisdictional challenge, apparently based on the broad authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1345
(1970). Coleman v. United States, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (ejectment); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (mineral rights); United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist.,
101 F. Supp. 298, 300-01 (S.D. Cal. 1951); 110 F. Supp. 767, 784 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (quiet title
in Cal., 28 U.S.C. § 1345 invoked).
The assertion is made that the United States like any other owner of property may have its
property rights adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, and may sue on a nonstatutory cause of action. United States v. Shanks, 384 F.2d 721, 723 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Gallas, 269 F. Supp. 141 (D. Md. 1967) (ejectment); United States v. Wilcox, 258 F.
Supp. 944 (N.D. Iowa 1966) (quiet title); United States v. Louisiana, 229 F. Supp. 14 (W.D.
La. 1964) (quiet title); United States v. Parks, 211 F. Supp. 516 (W.D.N.C. 1962) (quiet title).
Cf United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 338 (1906) (equitable title
under patent right). The United States does not, furthermore, waive its sovereign immunity by
the institution of an action. United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1953),
although successful defense against the action may amount to an adjudication of title. United
States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1971). But cf. United States v. Louisiana, 229 F.
Supp. 14 (W.D. La. 1964). The United States may also seek injunctive relief pending administrative determination of a disputed claim. United States v. Barrows, 404 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 974 (1969); United States v. Foresyth, 321 F. Supp. 761 (D. Colo.
1971); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
While such actions have been brought for seemingly minor property interests in the sovereign, the United States has not brought suit in one of the most active land ownership controversies now existing in the public land law field-the long-standing dispute over the Snake River
omitted lands. That dispute, involving some 15,000 acres of land located along the Snake River
in Idaho, appears to turn, at least in part, upon the resolution of a disputed legal issue involving
the effect of an erroneous government survey. Although Congress did pass relief legislation in
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-469, 76 Stat. 89, the problem continues to fester. See Ireland, Stapleton,
Pryor & Holmes, Study of Trespass and Unauthorized Use of the Public Lands of the United
States, in PLLRC REPORT 129-58.
114. The nature of the action which the United States may bring in the event that it is willing
to initiate steps to settle the land dispute by judicial means may be varied. Local state remedies
have been used, such as quiet title, trespass to try title and ejectment. Declaratory relief might
also be available, under the federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The statute is not available, however, to the private claimant, for it is well settled that it does not constitute a jurisdictional ground for suit where no other ground exists. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969);
Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D. Md. 1962).
115. The then assistant attorney general in charge of the Division of Lands and Natural
Resources testified on September 30, 1971, that
The fact that a claim of ownership of land is asserted, which is inconsistent with the
Government's own claim, is not ordinarily enough in itself to bring the Government into
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quieting of title must have some advantage to the United States. This
may be the case, for example, where the land is about to be sold as
surplus ' or the United States has some present use for the land." 7
Conversely, where the United States has no particular use for the land
or is indifferent toward the outstanding interest, it may feel its limited
resources for litigation may best be directed elsewhere. Also, the prospects of success in the quet title action should seem reasonably favorable. This could result in the ironic situation that the weaker the federal
claim, the more likely it will be that the true owner will be unable to
clear his title.
Self-help. If the claimant is unable to induce the United States to
sue, he may be able to provoke it to do so by occupying what is
claimed to be federal.' 18 The formidable practical problem with this
approach, however, is that the statute of limitations is inoperative
against the United States." 9 As a result, occupancies of federal lands,
although known to exist by government agents, are sometimes permitcourt to resolve the dispute. As a practical matter, unless the conflicting claimant is
interfering with the Government's use of land, or unless it is for some other reason
deemed to be in the interest of the United States to bring suit, no action will be taken.
Hearings on S. 216, S. 579 and S. 721, Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the
Senate Interiorand InsularAffairs Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
116. Interviews with the General Servikes Administration, which is responsible for disposition of surplus lands, indicate that title actions are readily brought where needed to maximize
the monetary return to the United States.
117. If Malone is read literally, of course, the United States could simply take possession
of the land and pay whatever compensation may fall due. Such direct action, however, could
be dissuaded both by a contemplation of proprieties in physically ejecting a private possessor
and by the reluctance to pay the compensation necessary if it should turn out that the land is
not in fact owned by the United States. In this regard, compensation for land taken by formal
condemnation procedures is normally paid out of individual appropriations to the department
or agency involved, while Court of Claims judgments are paid out of a special appropriations
for that purpose. 31 U.S.C. § 724a (1970).
118. In Malone v. Bowdoin, the private claimant offered to cut down a "hollow tree" on
the disputed land and let the United States bring a trespass action "or any other action they
desired," in order to get the matter settled. The invitation was declined. See Brief for the
Respondents before the Supreme Court at 8.
119. "Nullum tempus occurrit regi;" its reason is that "the law intended that the king is
always busied for the public good and therefore has not leisure to assert his right within the

times limited to subjects." I W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

§ 348 at 368-69 (Jones ed.,

1916). A more acceptable reason, it would be thought, in land controversies is that the vastness
of the federal lands and the limitations on federal manpower make any such limitation unacceptable as public policy. It has been recommended, however, that the doctrine of adverse possession
in cases of good faith occupancy should apply against the United States under modern conditions. PLLRC REPORT 260-62. See Comment, Real Property-Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi,
24 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 187 (1956).
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ted to exist until there is a federal use for the lands.1 0 This would be
especially true where the occupancy does not result in any diminution
of the value of the lands-such as where only grazing or farming are
taking place, as opposed to mineral extraction.' 2 ' Thus, it may, as a
practical matter, be difficult to induce the sovereign to sue.
There are also other problems with such a strategy. An assertion
of private ownership that is proven to have been in error, may, first
of all, result in consequences more serious than simple ejectment. It
can be a federal crime to trespass upon federal lands, 22 federal administrators may retaliate, for example, by denying grazing privileges,'2 civil damages for trespass can be imposed well in excess of
actual damage, 24 and any actual destruction of government property
may be heavily penalized.12 Moreover, where the United States is in
120. PLLRC REPORT 262.
121. A marked example of such passivity in the face of invasion occurred in the case of the
squatters on the banks of the lower Colorado River. Occupancy of federal lands along the river,
beginning around the time of the construction of Parker Dam in 1934, eventually reached the
point where the United States maintained that over 36,000 acres were illegally occupied. Ireland,
supra note 113, at 105. Two relief bills passed by the Congress in the 1960's to alleviate the fait
accompli faced by the United States were vetoed by President Johnson. Id. at 119-20. A third
bill was signed by President Nixon in 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-505, 84 Stat. 1106 (1970).
122. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1851-63 (1970). Other federal statutes can also provide for criminal
penalties for trespassing on public lands-for example, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970), which provides
for the establishment of national forests, contains a penalty provision of $500 or one year in
jail for violation of regulations promulgated under the statute. Such regulations prohibit, inter
alia, the cutting of timber, 36 C.F.R. § 261.6 (1971), grazing or fencing, id. § 261.11. Like
regulations exist for Interior lands. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 9239.0-7, .1-1 (1971). The civil damages
for trespassing can also be significant. In Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432
(1882), the principle was established that in assessing damages against a "wilful" trespasser,
the increase in value of the property taken attributable to the acts of the trespasser may be
included in the damages recoverable by the United States. Good faith mistake as to location or
the boundary is of course no defense to a trespass action. United States v. Hudspeth, 384 F.2d
683, 688 (9th Cir. 1967). Furthermore, an administrative determination as to the mineral nature
of public land will be conclusive in the absence of fraud or abuse of discretion, even where the
consequence is to brand the occupier a trespasser. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 107
F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 654 (1940). See generally Ireland, supra note
113.
123. See Clarence S. Miller, 67 Int. Dec. 145 (1960) (grazing licensee who repeatedly and
"wilfully" grazes his cattle in trespass on the public domain may be properly subjected to a
reduction of his grazing privileges).
124. See Ansay v. Boecking-Berry Equip. Co., 450 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 197 1).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). The nature of the dilemma in a somewhat analogous situation was recognized in Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1948), involving the validity
of a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior closing an Indian reservation to commercial
fishing without a permit:
In the pursuit of their otherwise lawful business respondents are threatened with criminal
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possession, it is less than obvious that a successful taking of possession by the private claimant, even if he be in fact the true owner, will
provide the relief he anticipates. The privilege of even one entitled to
possession to enter and recover by "force" is a matter of dispute.
Under the Statute of Forcible Entry, 21 for example, such action is a
criminal offense, and that statute has been accepted as part of the
common law, or reenacted, by nearly all the states. Many states also
provide a civil action for assault and battery or trespass, and a specific
and speedy statutory remedy for forcible entry' 27-that is, even one
entitled to possession of land can be ejected from property under the
forcible entry and detainer statutes as against one displaced from
possession. 128 In addition, the ousted party, in this case the United
States, even if a trespasser, can sue for damages for forcible entry,
29
and title in such an action is irrelevant.
Even should the land claimant be successful in provoking the

United States to sue 3 " for ejectment and succeeds in establishing his

title, this victory may be hollow if the United States decides to assert
possession. This is the implication of Malone53 as well as other cases
prosecution should they fish in the water of the Karluk Reservation without a permit
from the native village. For the violation of the applicable regulation under the White
Act, severe penalties are imposed, including fine, imprisonment, the summary seizure of
boats, haul, gear, equipment, and their forfeiture to the United States. These sanctions
deny to respondents an adequate remedy at law, for to challenge the regulation in an"
ordinary criminal proceeding is to hazard a loss against the payment of a license fee and
compliance with the fishing rules of the natives. Yet to stay out of the reservation
prevents the profitable operation of the canneries. Id. at 99.
126. 5 Rich. II, c. 2 (1381).
127. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 713(10) (McKinney, 1963).
128. 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 72 (2d ed. 1920); Annot., 45 A.L.R. 323 (1920).
129. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTs § 315, at 260-62 (1956). Of course the
questions as to what is "peaceable possession" by defendant and what is "force" used by
plaintiff in taking possession are major ones. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 123-24 (4th ed. 1971);
Shapre, Forcible Trespass to Real Property, 39 N.C.L. REv. 121 (1961) (which takes up the
analogous but little used purely common law crime of forcible trespass). As to what constitutes
"possession," see I RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 157 (1934).
130. Land claimants have indeed been successful in some cases in provoking suit by retaining possession against the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599
(1968) (ejectment against mining claimant); United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.
1971).
131. Of course, it could be argued that if a judgment in a quiet title or ejectment action
brought by the United States establishes ownership in the private disputant, the continued
possession by the United States would clearly be beyond the authority of the federal officer and
hence an officer's suit could be brought against him even under the Larson theory. See notes
19, 31 supra and accompanying text.
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decided well before it.132
Thus, while desperate straits may call for desperate measures, the

fact that the land disputant with the United States is put in such a
predicament that he must seriously consider self-help measures simply
highlights the need for reform of the present system.
Non-judicial relief. Finally, several non-judicial courses of action
should be mentioned. First, a private relief bill may be sought from

the Congress. This has long been the ultimate resort where sovereign
immunity has blocked judicial relief. The constitutional basis for such

relief is broad, including the power to dispose of property and the
power to pay the debts of the United States,133 which has been con-

strued to include those resting solely upon an equitable or honorary
obligation.'3' Indeed, both the passage of the Tucker Act and the

FTCA were in large part brought about by the desire of Congress to
rid itself of this burden.1

35

Congressional assistance may also be

sought in attempting to persuade the United States to initiate a quiet
3
title action on its own.1 1
Several rather general "relief" bills for land disputes have also

been enacted. The best-known is the Color of Title Act,' 7 which
132. Thus, in United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1953), the United States
had instituted an action for damages and to quiet title to disputed acreage. Certain of the
defendants were successful in proving that part of the disputed acreage belonged to them and
not the United States, and the district court entered an injunction prohibiting the United States
from further trespassing upon that part of the land. On appeal, the injunction was dissolved,
on the ground that because of sovereign immunity, "it is beyond dispute that unless expressly
permitted by an Act of Congress, no injunction can be granted against the United States." Id.
at 348. In United States v: Ivie, 163 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ga. 1957), the United States sought
in a civil action to enjoin the defendants from trespassing on certain forest lands to which it
claimed title by condemnation, and to recover damages for timber cut by defendants on that
property. Defendants also claimed title. There the court made a finding that the United States
had acquired valid title through the condemnation proceedings, but the implication was clear
that even if the condemnation proceedings had been ineffective, the only relief available to the
defendants where the United States had possession would be a Tucker Act action. Id. at 143.
But cf. United States v. Buras, 332 F. Supp. 1017, 1034 (E.D. La. 1970).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See note 171 infra.
134. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896).
135. See JAYSON §§ 52, 58 (sections 21.01-.02 contain an excellent general discussion of
the recommended steps in obtaining such relief).
136. The elimination of sovereign immunity in this area (land title disputes) would
also take an unpleasant burden off the backs of members of Congress. The mere fact
that no remedy is available, unless the Government in fact initiates a lawsuit to determine
title, means that many private individuals beseech their Congressmen to intervene on
their behalf to get the Department of Justice to initiate suit, because that is the only way
that the title can now be tried. Hearingson Sovereign Immunity 48.
137. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1068, 1068a (1970).
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provides in essence that where a tract of public land has been held in
adverse possession "under claim or color of title for more than twenty
years," and the land has either been improved or cultivated, a patent
shall be issued, and if taxes have been paid without improvements or
cultivation a patent may be issued upon payment of not less than
$1.25 per acre. The purchase price is based on appraised value, excluding value attributable to the applicant's improvements. The act
was designed to "materially reduce the number of hardship cases that
otherwise would have to be handled by private bills." 3 1 The Act has,
however, been strictly construed by the Interior Department and appears to have been of more limited usefulness than might have been
hoped.'39
LAND TITLE DISPUTES WITH THE SOVEREIGN: THE ROAD TO REFORM

The-foregoing discussion has shown the common futility of judicial efforts by the private claimant in land title disputes with the
sovereign. The next step toward a discussion of the principal factors
involved in statutory reform of this unsatisfactory status quo is to
briefly review the panoply of judicial remedies normally available to
one when he has a land title dispute with another private party, "0 and
to compare them with the remedies available in the land title dispute
with the sovereign.
138. S. REp. No. 588, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2014, 2016.
139. See PLLRC REPORT 259. Thus, denial of a patent in the discretionary situation
involving tax payments has been held to be non-reviewable, Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96
(N.D. Cal. 1963); the statute is said to cover only patentable public lands, 43 C.F.R.
§ 2540.05(b) (1970). See also Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 937 (1966). In addition, a claim based upon color of title must be shown to be based
upon a written document, Howerton, 71 Int. Dec. 429 (1964); Mafreer, 70 Int. Dec. 145 (1963),
and a claim will lack "good faith" where it is asserted with knowledge that the land is owned
(which has been interpreted to mean claimed) by the United States. 43 C.F.R. § 2540.05kb)
(1970). Lester J. Hamel, 74 Int. Dec. 125 (1967); Prentis E. Furlow, 70 Int. Dec. 500 (1963).
140. The problem of resolving an existing land title dispute should not be confused with the
problem of ensuring the validity of a particular title, as against the world, which has led to a
vast body of literature and a number of proposed reforms-for example, the Torrens title system
and marketability of title acts. See generally C. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES (2d ed. 1970).
This is not to say, of course, that the issues and remedies do not in part overlap. However, the
problem discussed in this article involves only an existing dispute with an identified counterclaimant, the United States, and thus the entangling issues of service by publication, unknown
claimants, and so forth are here absent. The suit to quiet title has been exhaustively reviewed in
its role as a mechanism for title security in Note, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The
Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1245 (1959).
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Land Dispute Resolution in the PrivateSector
The most striking feature of a survey of the array of real property
actions and remedies is their variety, prolixity and complexity.'41
Steeped in the ancient history of English law, bedeviled by the remnants of the old common law forms of actions, barnacled by the
encrustment of centuries of judicial decisions, the nature of the subject
matter would stamp any state-by-state or action-by-action chronicle
as neither feasible, nor useful. In the context of statutory reform,
however, a helpful analysis may be found in approaching the problem
from the point of view of available remedies which may be characterized as declarative, specific and compensatory.'
Indeed, the forms
of action may be used in a rather imprecise sense as short-hand

phrases to reflect this situation. Thus, trespass will lie where a plaintiff
seeks damages from a defendant who is, or has been, in actual posses-

sion or use of plaintiff's land (compensatory relief); ejectment will lie
when the defendant is in possession and the plaintiff seeks possession

himself (specific relief); and quiet title will lie in all other cases (declarative relief).
Damages (Herein of Trespass). At common law, the form of action to be used in a land dispute where damages were sought was some
variant of trespass. An extraordinary amount of legal brainpower
went into such determination as whether trespass quare clausumfregit
or trespass on the case was the appropriate form of action. A critical

element of the former was that the plaintiff had to have possession of
the property at the time of the trespass.'

If he did not then have, or

was not then entitled to, possession, the action would not lie."'
141. The following discussion is, of course, summary in nature. It is designed as a refresher
of basic principles. Exhaustive studies of each of the forms of actions and equitable remedies
may be found not only in the cited works (which are deliberately picked by and large as of recent
issue) but in the numerous authorities which may be found therein.
142. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL &A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 (1968).
143. See, e.g., Daniels v. Coleman, 253 S.C. 218, 169 S.E.2d 593 (1969). The logic was that
the lodestone of title is the right to possess, and it was the possessory right that trespass
protected. This characteristic led to the development of fixed rules as to the nature of the
tort-for example, strict liability and the absence of any need for actual damage. Furthermore,
since the action was designed to protect the interest in exclusive possession of the land in its
intact physical condition, any person in actual possession, even one with no legal title, could
maintain the action. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS would limit the no-damage requirement to cases where the trespass was intentional, so that the trespass action would then be used
only in a genuine title dispute. See W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 63-75 (4th ed. 1971).
144. It is not altogether easy to reconcile the cases or draw the line with precision as to what
constitutes adequate "possession." W. PROSSER, TORTS § 74 (4th ed. 1971).
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Rather, the action would then be trespass on the case-for the damage
to the reversion-or in ejectment-if the plaintiff did not then have,
but was entitled to, possession.' Once ejectment was successful and
possession regained, the appropriate action would then be trespass for
mesne profits-that is, damages for the period of possession by the
defendant.146
The availability of this remedy in title disputes, however, is clearly
limited. It is applicable only where the defendant is, or has been, in
possession of the property in dispute, or has used the land in some
lesser way. The damage remedy provides no relief where the claimed
interest of the defendant has not been or cannot by its nature be
asserted by taking or interfering with possession. Furthermore, while
title may often be involved, it is not the essence of a trespass action.
Specific relief(Herein of Ejectment). Insofar as ownership and the
right to possession are one, ejectment is the ultimate remedy. Specific
relief began as little more than a variant of trespass, adapted to the
situation where the trespasser had acquired possession, 4 7 and because
of its relatively streamlined nature, it replaced the older "possessory
writs"' 45 as the means to obtain possession of land. The limitations
of this remedy, however, were significant. It provided, most importantly, no relief against a land disputant who claimed title but was
not in possession. Ejectment was also unavailable for non-possessory
interests such as easements, and, since it was fictitious in form, it had
no res judicata effect.'
Statutory forms of the ejectment action are now prevalent in most,
if not all, states. They retain as their basic purpose the recovery of
possession from the adverse claimant rather than trying title as
such. 5 ' For other forms of relief, however, the plaintiff must turn to
145. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Superior Oil Co., 237 N.E.2d 492 (111.1968); More v. Urbano,
198 A.2d 211 (Conn. 1964).
146. See generally J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 114 (1969).
147. See J. CRIBBERT, JUDICIAL REMEDIES 116-19 (1954); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS 7 (1956).
148. See J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY. supra note 146, § 106.

149. See D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 81 (1962).
150. Although it is a maxim that in ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the strength of
his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary's, this means only that the plaintiff must
show a right to possession superior to the defendant, either by proving a superior title or by
proving prior possession where the defendant is a mere trespasser. Bradshaw v. Ashley, 180 U.S.
59 (1901). In any event, it remains true that "no adequate relief to the owners of real property
against the adverse claims of parties not in possession can be given by a court of law." Holland
v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 24 (1884).
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modern equivalents of equity jurisdiction.
Declaratory Relief (Herein of Quiet Title). Modern equity-type
jurisdiction in land title disputes has grown out of two ancient equitable remedies: the bill of peace and the bill quia timet. The bill of peace,
designed to prevent multiple suits at law, was designed to cover two
situations: first, where a number of rival claimants to the land existed,
and, second, where a defendant repeatedly took possession of plaintiff's land, requiring continuous ejectment actions.' 5' To avert such
multiple suits, equity was prepared by way of a bill of peace to render
a judgment and enjoin the parties from any further actions. Certain
rigid jurisdictional prerequisites were imposed. The most important
was that the plaintiff was required to be in possession, otherwise an
ejectment action would normally lie as an adequate remedy at law.
In addition, at least for relief against repeated ejectment actions, the
plaintiff had to have been harassed, and to have established his good
title in at least one legal action.
The bill quia timet (because he fears) had a different purpose: to
aid a plaintiff faced with some sort of cloud on his title, usually a
document purportedly vesting a title interest in another. The fear was
that because of delay witnesses would die or evidence would be lost
or destroyed, leaving the plaintiff vulnerable to a later suit at law. To
avoid'such a result equity would grant relief by cancelling the instrument or ordering a release. Here again, however, because of the nature
of the action, jurisdictional and decisional rules hampered the rendering of full relief. The plaintiff was required to have possession, the
adverse claim had to be evidenced by an apparently valid writing, and
an instrument void "on its face" would not invoke the remedy since
its validity was plain to all, and only claimants of fee title could sue.
As the original form of the suit to quiet title gradually became
obsolete-such as ejectment suits being given res judicata effect-its
name was applied to all actions of a fundamentally declarative nature
brought to settle titles to land. The various technical limitations imposed on both the ancient bills of peace and bills quia timet were
removed in many states by specific statutory provisions confirming
and expanding the action. In a number of states, the statutes provided
for the inclusion of unknown as well as known parties, giving the
151. Because of the fictitious nature of the ejectment action, involving nonexistent leases,
res judicata did not apply. See J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 146, at 229-3 1.
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action an in rem or quasi in rem character. But at its heart, with all
the diversity from state to state,15 2 the quiet title action remains one
of a declaratory nature. 53 Although marked procedural technicalities
and differences continue to exist, it may be generally said that in the
states today some judicial procedure exists whereby land title disputants may obtain a declaratory resolution 5 4 of most conflicts. 15 It is
152. The sharp variety in requirements from state to state is finely detailed in the superb
Note. 68 YALE L.J., supra note 140. In recent years, for example, cases have involved such issues
as the need for a plaintiff cotenant in common to join his cotenant in a quiet title action, Velasco
v. Mallory, 5 Ark. App. 406, 428 P.2d 540 (1967), the right to a jury trial, Anderson v. Whipple,
71 Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351 (1951), and the need for plaintiff to have possession, Currier v.
Gonsales. 78 N.M. 541, 434 P.2d 66, and 467 P.2d 719. Many other important areas of
difference exist.
153. The foregoing summary of the growth of declaratory relief in land title disputes has
been taken from a number of sources. See D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 82-83 (1962); H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY ch. 19 (2d ed. 1948); Finnegan, Problems and
Procedure in Quiet Title Actions, 26 NEB. L. REv. 485 (1947). See also Sharon v. Tucker, 144
U.S. 533 (1892); Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Cal. 2d 671, 62 P.2d 358 (1936); 1 J. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 246 (5th ed. 1941); Howard, Bills to Remove Clouds from Title, 25
W. VA. L. REV. 109 (1917); Note, supra note 140.
154. To a considerable degree, the quiet title action was a precursor to the modern action
for declaratory relief. Declaratory judgment statutes simply make available generally the use
of a device that theretofore existed only in certain fields-for example, construction of wills,
instructions as to management of trusts and estates, bills of interpleader, action to annul
marriages, as well as real property actions. Indeed, the question has been raised in another
context whether the need for. and hence the availability of, such equitable remedies as bills of
peace, quia timet, and injunction should be reconsidered in view of the existence of declaratory
relief. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
155. Examination of the available remedies in California, a state with extensive federallyowned property, may be illustrative. In that state there is only one form of civil action for the
enforcement or protection of private rights, but much of the respective nature of the rights of
action and the rules governing damages survives. Thus ejectment remains as basically a possessory action, and is designed to allow a plaintiff to recover possession from a defendant who
unlawfully holds the property. The action squarely raises the issue of the greater right to
possession, and to the extent that title is put into issue, it has a res judicata effect against the
defendant. The critical element, of course, is that as part of his cause of action, plaintiff must
have a present right of possession as against the defendant.
The preferred remedy in California, in many cases, is one of the statutory actions to determine adverse claims, CAL. Clv. PRO. CODE §§ 738, 749, 749.1, 751, 1050 (West 1955), or to
remove a cloud from title, id. §§ 3412-14 (West 1970). The former are the outgrowth of the
old bill of peace, designed to put to an end the continuous disturbance of a party's possession.
Although at common law an ejectment action had actually to have been brought, under the
statute any adverse claim will suffice. The basic point is that the action is not aimed at a
particular piece of evidence, but at the pretentions of an individual. The action to remove a
cloud, on the other hand, is aimed at a particular instrument, and a piece of evidence. It is an
application of the equitable bill quia timet. Unlike the actions in trespass or ejectment, however,
title, not possession, is the primary interest at stake. Although the equitable actions were not
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the absence of any equivalent remedy in the case of land disputes with

the United States that presents the major inequity requiring reform.
The Casefor Reform

Prior to the Tucker Act, a contractor with the United States was
wholly without judicial remedy in the event of breach. Prior to the

Federal Tort Claims Act, an injured person was wholly without judicial remedy when the United States was the tortfeasor. As has been

shown, however, the private disputant in a land title dispute with the
United States ig not always wholly without a judicial remedy.

As a general principle, it may be asserted that in any case where
damages are available as a remedy in a dispute between private land
disputants, similar compensation is available in land title disputes

with the United States. Where the action of the United States is such
as to constitute a constitutional taking, a remedy is available under

the Tucker Act. Where the act of the United States is of a lesser
nature, damages may be available under the FTCA. The question

which must, therefore, be answered is why is this not sufficient. The
answer, as demonstrated by the foregoing discussion of remedies
available in the case of private land title disputants, lies in the fact

that it is inherent in the nature of land title disputes that damages are
often not the most appropriate remedy, and indeed are often not an

available remedy at all.
Inadequacy of the damages remedy.' One of the most firmly
established principles in American jurisprudence is that where land is
available at common law to a plaintiff out of possession, the California statute has no such
limitation. Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Cal. 2d 671, 62 P.2d 358 (1936). See generally Williamson,
Improving California's Quiet Title Laws, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 835 (1970).
156. The discussion of the inadequacy of damages speaks in terms of the plaintiff. The
United States as defendant also should have an interest in making available relief other than
compensatory damages. The cost to the government in forced condemnation could be far more
expensive and administratively less desirable than a simple stoppage of the complained of
activity. See, e.g., Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56, 60-61 (5th Cir. 1964); Cramton 414.
On the other hand, if the federal government does not want to keep (and pay for) the land where
it does not have title, it is possible that the Tucker Act taking could be found to be temporary
only, and the property returned in specie to the true owner. See Transcript of Record, Malone
v. Bowdoin, at 47 n.2. If the government occupied the land under claim of title, however, it
would seem this should be the option of the injured private party, not the government's.
It should be added that the discussion in this section covers only the specific problems raised
by sovereign immunity in the land title dispute area. To them may be added all the arguments
for abolishing sovereign immunity across the board, set forth in the authorities cited in notes
15 and 23 supra.
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involved there is no substitute for the thing itself.1 57 The reasons why
this uniqueness must inexorably lead to specific relief rather than
damages, however, are only dimly articulated. 15 No doubt practicality (the evaluation of land is a difficult and uncertain art),'59 reality
(land is often of special, individualized use to one individual and not
to another),'6 and sentimentality (the old homestead can be literally
priceless)' 1" are all separately or in combination responsible. These
classic reasons do not necessarily outweigh the potentially superior
interests of the sovereign. They do suggest, however, that unless a case
157. [L]and-a favorite and favored subject in England, and every country of Anglo
Saxon origin. Our constitution gives to land preeminence over every other species of
property; and our law, whether administered in Courts of law or of equity, gives to it
the same preference. Land, whether rich or poor, cannot be taken to pay debts until the
personal property is exhausted. Contracts concerning land must be in writing. Land must
be sold at the Court House, must be conveyed by deeds duly registered, and other
instances "too tedious to mention." The principle is, that land is assumed to have a
peculiar value, so as to give an equity for a specific performance, without reference to
its quality or quantity. Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 190, 192 (1851).
(The force of the quotation should not be impaired by the unfortunate further reference that
"the same is assumed as to slaves.")
In less lyric form, the sui generis nature of land and the consequent inadequacy of money
damages has been recognized over and over again. See, e.g., Danciger Oil Ref. Co. v. Burroughs,
75 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 758 (1935); Wilhite v. Skelton, 149 F. 67 (1906);
Clark v. Cagle, 141 Ga. 73, 82 S.E. 21 (1914); Bennett v. Moon, 110 Neb. 692, 194 N.W. 802
(1923); Spencer v. Bales, 108 Ore. 339, 216 P. 746 (1923); Larrabee v. Bjorkman, 79 Ore. 467,
155 P. 974 (1916); In re Scott, [1895] 2 Ch. 603.
The same principle is expressed by the textbook authorities, see G. CLARK, EQUITY § 42
(1919); H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 44 (2d ed. 1948); J. POMEROY, EQUITABLE REMEDIES
§ 2184 (2d ed. 1892); W. WALSH, EQUITY 303 (1930), and the periodical literature. See Cox,
Specific Performance of Contracts to Sell Land, 16 Ky. L.J. 338 (1928); Lee, Remedies for
Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 550, 570 (1965).
158. E.g., "In a suit by vendee for specific performance of a land sale contract, the inadequacy of the remedy at law is generally accepted without discussion." K. YORK & J. BAUMAN,
REMEDIES

949 (1967).

159. Where the damage to the plaintiff-vendee can be absolutely measured-for example,
where he has contracted to resell the land-the principle of specific performance has occasionally been challenged, Hazelton v. Miller, 25 D.C. App. 337 (1905), affd on other groundssub
noin. Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71 (1906), but generally rejected. K. YORK &J. BAUMAN,
REMIEmS

949 (1967).

160. This is the explanation given in Adderly v. Dixon, 57 Eng. Rep. 239, 240 (1824). In
the Kitchen case, see note 157 supra, the argument was made that since the land was only good
for timber, no special use was involved and therefore no specific relief should be given.
161. An articulated discussion of this factor appears more starkly in the cases discussing
the availability of specific relief in contracts for the sale of personal property. See, e.g., Pusey
v. Pusey, 23 Eng. Rep. 465, 1 Vern. 273 (1684) (the family horn given by King Canute); Duke
of Somerset v. Cookson, 24 Eng. Rep. 1114, 3 Peere Williams 390 (1735) (silver altar-piece);
Burr v. Bloomsburg, 101 N.J. Eq. 615, 138 A. 876 (1927) (diamond ring).
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can be made that shows those superior interests to be unprovided for,
specific relief in the form of recovery of the land itself, rather than
damages, should be an available remedy to the private title disputant
with the United States. Surely the overriding power of eminent domain, which permits the sovereign to obtain land required "for public
use," should normally protect the interests of the sovereign.
Indeed, a special feature of the inadequacy of damages doctrine
is present in the case of land disputes with the sovereign. In the
presently available Tucker Act proceedings for the kind of "taking"
under discussion, the amount paid for a taking, while in a sense
"damages" is better characterized as compensation paid for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 6 The considerations involved
162. Generally, the principles relating to recovery in inverse condemnation do not differ
from those involved in formal condemnation actions. Consequential damages are not allowable,
at least in those terms. D. MANDELKER, INVERSE CONDEMNATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES 19-20 (1964). See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
The taking by condemnation of an interest less than the fee is familiar in the law of
eminent domain. Where formal proceedings are initiated by the party condemning, it is
usual and proper to specify the precise interest taken, where less than the fee. But where,
as in this case, the property-owner resorts to the courts, as he may, to recover compensation for what actually had been taken, upon the principle that the Government by the
very act of taking impliedly has promised to make compensation because the dictates of
justice and the terms of the Fifth Amendment so require . . ., and it appears that less
than the whole has been taken and is to be paid for, such a right or interest will be deemed
to pass as is necessary fairly to effectuate the purpose of the taking. . . .Id. at 328-29,
That the principles do not differ is further attested to by the tendency of the Supreme Court
to discuss formal proceedings and inverse condemnation suits interchangeably. For example, in
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950), plaintiff sued for the destruction of the agricultural value of his land. A formal proceeding, United States v. Chicago, M.
St. P. & Pac. Ry. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941), was seen as pointing the way to decision. Moreover,
Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. Ry. Co. was seen as limiting Cress, an inverse condemnation action,
but in a way not pertinent to this note. Then in United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365
U.S. 624 (1961), a formal proceeding, Kansas City Insurance was cited, and in United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956), the Court found it necessary to distinguish Kansas
City Insurance.
MANDELKER, supra, distinguishes between two types of inverse suits: those in which the
damage is evident on completion of the government's improvement, where "the fact that recovery is had by way of inverse does not alter the substantive result," id. at 2, and those in which
the damage is only probable on completion of the improvement, where there could be no
recovery at that time. Mandelker points out ihat in the latter type, tort and nuisance theories
have tended to creep into the discussions, in part because of the prevalent and continuing state
immunity from tort liability, which leads to rather tortured applications of the doctrine of
inverse condemnation. For the purposes of this article, however, it is only important that in what
must be considered part of the "evident" class of cases-that is, cases in which a landowner
would desire to remove some form of government encumbrance on his land, the principles
relating to recovery in formal condemnation would apply, and consequential damages would
not be allowable.
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in the two concepts do not perfectly coincide, with the result that the
compensation paid in a Tucker Act action may be significantly less
than the true cost-that is, damages-to the claimant. In such a
situation, specific relief would be of enhanced relevance.
Without. attempting to review exhaustively the principles relating
to compensation in federal condemnation,1 3 the basic principle at
work is that the compensation is paid for the interests in the land
taken, and not for consequential damages." 4 Thus, no compensation
is generally payable for such losses as good will, lost profits, moving
expenses, and start-up expenses at a new location.' Furthermore, in
valuation of the property taken, the general market value of the land
is the test for compensation, not an individualized computation as to
the value to the actual owner.' 66 In damages for trespass, by comparison, both particularized damages to the owner and consequential
damages can be awarded, since the aim is to make the particular
plaintiff whole for the wrongful act of the tort-feasor 67
Unavailability of the damages remedy. Far more troublesome
than the inadequacy of the damages remedy at present is the nonavailability of damages to many private disputants who are significantly
affected by a possible federal interest in their land. In order for a
Tucker Act action to be available, the United States must be actively
asserting its interest, to the extent that an actual "taking" has occurred. 68 A similar dilemma existed in time past with regard to purely
163. The classic work is NICHOLS. A -good capsule discussion is Study of Compensation
and Assistance for Persons Affected by Real Property Acquisitions in Federaland Federally
Related Programs,COMMITTEE PRINT No. 31, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-87 (1965).
164. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925). See 4A NICHOLS ch. XIV.
165. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. Powelson,
319 U.S. 266, 281-83 (1942); United States v. 22.95 Acres, 450 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1971); R.J.
Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988 (Ct. CI. 1966); 4 NICHOLS § 14, 2471; COMMITTEE
Print No. 31, supra note 163, at 54-55. But cf. P.L. 91-646 (1970). See Aloit & Goldring,
Reevaluation of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L.Q.
604 (1968).
166. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1964). In measuring the property interest taken, the test is the
loss to the owner, not the gain to the condemnor: Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,
supra, at 13; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
167. A good recent case is Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr.
357 (1963). In discussing the appropriate damages, the court cited many prior holdings granting
damages, where appropriate, for such items as cost of making repairs, loss of use of the
property, lost profits, loss of prospective profits, and increased operating expenses pending
repairs.
168. See notes 77-87 supra and accompanying text.
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private disputes. The land disputant had legal causes of action in
trespass for damages or ejectment for possession by the rival claimant, but if the rival claimant passively asserted no rights, or if the
interest was nonpossessory, neither legal form of action was available.
To fill this void the equitable remedy of quiet title arose,
In land title disputes with the United States, however, there is no
such relief, which presents an especially severe problem. The absence
of property taxes and of the profit incentive eliminates economic
pressures upon the United States to assert a possessory interest.
Moreover, since neither adverse possession 69 nor laches170 operate
against it, the United States has no incentive for those reasons to
actively assert its interests, even against an allegedly trespassing land
disputant-thus, there will be no Tucker Act cause of action. Besides
making the damage remedy essentially unavailable, this state of affairs also inhibits the economic development of land in which it is
feared that there may be an ownership claim by the United States at
some future time. Extractive resources in land, such as timber or
minerals, may go unused; construction and other improvements may
go unbuilt. Land as a limited resource should not be so restrained
from maximum use.
The possibility of a nonpossessory interest in the United States
is also very real, inasmuch as patents from it have often reserved
mineral rights and the like, or granted defeasible interests. Likewise,
disputed restrictive covenants, equitable servitudes, and negative ease169. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1938). The theory seems
to have been that "the king is always busy in the public good and has not the leisure to assert
his right within the times limited to his subject." See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
Until 1966, no general statute of limitations applied to the United States. In that year, such a

statute was passed, Pub. L. No. 89-505, §§ 2415-16, 80 Stat. 304 (1966), but it expressly
provided that "[niothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to

establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property." 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c)
(1970). The statute does provide that "an action to recover damages resulting from a trespass

on lands of the United States, including trust or restricted Indian lands

. . .

may be brought

within six years after the right of action accrues." Id. § 2415(b).

170. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,40 (1946); Utah Power &Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917). Whether the new general statute of limitations will cut into
this doctrine remains to be seen. The Public Land Law Review Commission has, however,
recommended that the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches should be available against the
United States, as well as the doctrine of adverse possession "where land has been occupied in
good faith." PLLRC REPORT 260-61. See Note, Immunity from Statutes of Limitations and
Other Doctrines Favoringthe United States as Plaintiff,55 COLUI. L. REV. 1177 (1955).
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ments are all beyond challenge or recompense absent an actual violation thereof by the private disputant and an affirmative attempt to
assert the rights by the United States. Future interests, moreover,
such as reverter and re-entry rights, may not be actively asserted by
the United States regardless of its willingness to do so, until the event
occurs which triggers the right. The United States is even barred in
most cases from effectively disclaiming an interest in land which may
be of dubious validity or worth, 17 1 thus resolving the dispute by conveyance of a quitclaim.
Fundamentalunfairness.Transcending the issues of inadequacy or
absence of damages is a question of fundamental fairness. Deepseated in Anglo-American law is the doctrine that ownership entitles
the individual to possession of the property itself and he need take no
substitute. Thus, a breach of contract to sell goods may result in
damages, but not specific performance. If, however, a bailee refuses
to deliver up bailed goods themselves, the true owner may obtain
possession of the goods in replevin and is not forced to accept their
equivalent in damages. 72 So, too, if a structure extends onto another's
land, he may, as a general principle, subject to equitable considerations such as relative hardship, require the structure itself to be removed and need not accept damages. 7 3 "In itself nothing can be more
reasonable than that the man who by wrong detains my property,
' 7
should be compelled to restore it to me again in specie."' 1
The sovereign, of course, has overriding rights in eminent domain.
But where congressional authorization is lacking or no public purpose
171. Under the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, (cl. 2), only the Congress may dispose
of property belonging to the United States, and executive branch officials are powerless in this
regard absent congressional authorization. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947);
Osbourne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944).
172. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 223, 237 (1934). The action in most states is statutory
in nature, called "replevin" or "action in claim and delivery" or "action to recover a chattel."
M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, & H. SMIT, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 73 (1970). It is true
that the effectiveness of the specific remedy may be limited by the inability to locate the chattel,
and so-called "equitable replevin," forcing cooperation by the defendant, is more limited by
considerations of uniqueness. See, e.g., Charles Simkin &Sons v. Massiah, 289 F.2d 26 (3d Cir.
1961); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 946, comments a and b (1934).
173. See, e.g., Brown Derby Hollywood Corp. v. Hatton, 61 Cal. 2d 855, 395 P.2d 896, 40
Cal. Rptr. 848 (1964); O'Havia v. Savarese, 338 Mass. 330, 155 N.E.2d 432, 2 A.L.R.3d 997
(1959).
174. Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 24 Eng. Rep. 1114, 3 Peere Williams 390 (Chancery
1735). For more arcane references, going back to the Digest of Justinian, see Successin of Or,
219 La. 1,51 So. 2d 804 (1951).
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is involved, it is both unfair and unseemly that the sovereign should
force the true owner to accept damages in lieu of possession. The basic
philosophy at stake was articulated two decades ago by Mr. Justice
Douglas in Land v. Dollar,7 the last Supreme Court case effectively
to follow United States v. Lee:
[Plublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding the limits of their
authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattels,
recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity, he is not relegated to the
Court of Claims to recover a money judgment. The dominant interest of the
sovereign is then on the side of the victim who may bring his possessory action
to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld. 7 6

Considerationsof Statutory Reform

The general principle may thus be stated that judicial resolution
of land title disputes between the United States and private parties
should not be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is next

necessary to explore the considerations involved in determining the
shape, form and scope of the statutory relief that should be forthcom77
ing.
Right to possession. To the extent that the doctrine of sovereign

immunity has any justification in its application to land title disputes
with the sovereign, it arises out of the fear that if specific relief is
allowed in lieu of damages, governmental functions could be subject

to undue interference. 78 The point reflects a justified concern, and
possible untoward disruption of governmental functions should be

taken into account in any statutory reform. This suggests that any
actual possession by the United States of the disputed land should not
175. 330 U.S. 731 (1947). The case involved an action for an injunction to require the
government to return specific shares of stock alleged to be owned by the plaintiff which had
been pledged to the government as collateral for a debt that had been paid. The government's
defense was that the stock had not been pledged but transferred outright,
176. Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
177. The United States Department of Justice has proposed legislation which, in amended
form has passed the Senate, would permit the bringing of quiet-title actions against the United
States. See text at note 286 infra. This important proposal has served as a vehicle for crystalizing
the considerations here discussed. The decision was made to frame the discussion in an abstract
form rather than as a section-by-section analysis of the proposed bill, in the belief that a more
permanent analysis of the underlying factors can thereby be presented. References to relevant
sections of the Justice bill and the Senate-passed bill are, however, set forth where appropriate;
and the full text of the Justice bill, prior to amendment, is printed in the Appendix to this
article.
178. See, e.g., Larson v. Foreign & Domestic Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
See also Cramton 397.
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be disturbed until a final adjudication of the state of the title has been
made. In private litigation, an ejectment action will lie at that point,
1 79
either independently or in connection with the quiet title action.
Thus, it is appropriate to assert that once title has been determined
to be in another, the United States should be required to follow the
procedures for acquiring property by eminent domain if it wishes to
retain possession. 180 Formal proceedings in eminent domain are not,

however, the only "normal" means by which the United States can
lawfully acquire property under its constitutional power to take private property for public use. 8' For example, in Dugan v. Rank,1 8 2 the

Court specifically found that Congress itself had authorized the
United States to acquire water rights by physical seizure, with relief

to be found in a Tucker Act action.'8 Thus, pursuant to congressional
authorization, the United States can exercise its power of eminent

domain either by entering into physical possession of property without a court order"" or by instituting condemnation proceedings.'5

Under the first method, the owner must look to the Tucker Act
remedy; under the second, the statutes may be broadly classified either
as requiring compensation before the United States takes posses-

sion 86 or permitting it to take immediate possession upon court order
without prior compensation.187
179. See notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text.
180. E.g., "[T]he government should not be able to seize private land without following
eminent domain procedures." Hearingson Sovereign Immunity 26.
181. The power of the Government to take private property for public use has been declared
an "integral aspect of sovereignty." Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
182. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
183. See also Turner v. Kings River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966); State
v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340, 354-55 (1961). Another example of the United States having the power
to summarily seize property with the owner relegated to a damage claim is in the field of patent
and copyright infringement. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1970); SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT § 11.105.
184. It may be speculated, however, whether Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1967) may not have affected this practice, at least where the United States concedes title to
rest in another.
185. Another rarely-used method is for the Congress by statute simply to declare that title
to certain land is thereby vested in the United States. This was done in 1968 with respect to the
establishment of the Redwood National Park. 16 U.S.C. § 79c(b)(I) (1970). The Act further
provided that any action for compensation against the United States for the taking should be
brought in inverse condemnation under the Tucker Act. Cf. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians
v. United States, 100 Ct. CI. 413 (1943).
186. See. e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 257 (1970), 10 U.S.C. § 2663 (1970).
187. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 594 (1970). See also Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U.S.
334, 340 (1963); United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958). The fifth amendment does not
require compensation to be paid in advance of the taking. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104
(1932).
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The critical point at issue, then, may be whether the taking of the
property by seizure without court order is authorized by law in a given
case. In cases where such seizure is so authorized and it is adjudicated
that title is in the private party, there would seem to be no significant
objection to permitting the court hearing the quiet title action to
adjudicate the issue of Tucker Act damages as well.' However, where
summary seizure is not legally permissible, and condemnation must
be carried out by other methods, it would be unjust for the United
States to retain possession without being required to follow the prescribed methods. Important differences could result-for example,
entitlement to a jury trial'I" or the right to raise the defense of lack of
public purpose."" Above all, any provision providing a limited right
in the United States to retain possession until final judgment should
not be expanded into a back-door general congressional authorization
permitting, in effect, land seizures as a general lawful condemnation
technique.' Any truly serious problems presented to the United
States by a requirement that it deliver up possession where title is
decreed against it and statutory authority is lacking to permit imme188. Where the damages are less than S 10,000, the district court would have jurisdiction in
any event. While the plaintiff might object that he would have preferred to bring the action for
damages in the Court of Claims, no serious inequity seems sufficient to outweigh the desirability
of cleaning up the dispute in a single action. The courts have interpreted congressional intent
to assure that "substantial rights of claimants are to be governed alike whether suit is brought
in the Court of Claims or the District Court." Bates Mfg. Co. v. United States, 303 U.S. 567,
570 (1938). Thus, for example, sections of the judicial code in terms applicable to the Court of
Claims alone are held applicable to the district courts as well in cases involving concurrent
jurisdiction. See SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT 96. Where the damages exceed $10,000, however,
there can be objection based upon considerations of orderliness and uniformity of result, and
provision should, therefore, be made for transfer of the case to the Court of Claims. Indeed, 28
U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1970) does permit the transfer of a case from the district court to the Court
of Claims "in the interest of justice." It would indeed seem appropriate that, upon assertion
early in the litigation that the United States intended to assert its right of seizure in the event
that title should be found to be in the plaintiff, the district court should thereupon transfer the
case.
189. See notes 201-04 infra, and accompanying text.
190. See notes 53-54supraand accompanying text.
191. The Justice bill provides that the United States may retain possession and control over
the disputed property until final judgment, and thereafter (in the event of adverse determination)
upon payment into court of just compensation. JUSTICE BILL § 2409a(b). The Senate-passed
bill amended this section to require such possession or control to have existed at least ninety
days prior to the commencement of the action, and, in the event of adverse determination, to
require the United States to file a separate condemnation action within ninety days if it wishes
to retain possession or control.
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diate condemnation 9 2 should be resolvable by the broad equitable
willingness, in appropriate cases, to weigh relative hardships before
93
requiring dispossession.
Jury trial. The classic quiet title action, being equitable in nature,
did not involve the right to jury trial. However, where an ejectment
action was available-that is, where the defendant had possession-equity would, under the traditional doctrine of adequate remedy at law, decline to take jurisdiction. Thus, the right to a jury trial
in such cases was preserved. A statutory waiver by the United States
of its sovereign immunity in land title disputes, then, presents two
questions: first, whether absent any provision a jury trial right would
exist' 94 and second whether the United States may or should condition its waiver upon the absence of a jury trial.
Although state law is by and large controlling on the substantive
claims in land title disputes, characterization of the claims as legal
or equitable for determining whether a right to jury trial exists in
federal court must be made under federal law.' 95 Thus, simply because
a state statute has expanded the traditional equity action to permit
suits to quiet title where the defendant is in possession, the right to
trial by jury in an action brought in federal court under the state
statute is not thereby thwarted.'9 6 The Supreme Court may, in addition, be pushing the question one step further by approaching a doctrine that if the basic issue is "legal," the right to a jury trial exists
under the seventh amendment even if the form of action and relief
192. The anomaly involved in holding that a public official was "unauthorized to seize
land," and yet permitting Tucker Act damages to be obtained, is discussed in the first section
of this article. See notes 44-55 supra and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Dolske v. Gromley, 58 Cal. 2d 513, 25 Cal. Rptr. 270, 375 P.2d 174 (1964).
194. Absent an express provision in a statute waiving sovereign immunity, plaintiffs right
to a jury in an action against the United States will depend upon whether such a right would
exist in an ordinary action of the same type. See United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921);
Collins v. Virgin Islands, 366 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 958 (1967); Hacker
v. United States, 16 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1927); cf. Law v. United States, 266 U.S. 494 (1925).
195. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 643
(5th Cir. 1971) (right to jury trial exists in trespass action brought by the United States). The
declaratory judgment action, as an interesting blend of law and equity jurisdiction, presents an
especially acute problem as to the right to a jury trial. See Note, Right to Trial by Jury in
DeclaratoryJudgment Actions, 3 CONN. L. REV. 564 (1971).
196. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.11 [5] (2d ed. 1969). See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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were traditionally "equitable" in nature. 9 7 Thus, although a quiet
title action is equitable, the basic issue of "title" is clearly "legal"
and by that analysis a jury trial right would exist.
It does not, however, follow that the United States in waiving its
immunity would be similarly bound. Since the waiver of sovereign
immunity is a privilege, the government may. notwithstanding the
seventh amendment, attach to it a condition that trial shall not be by
jury. ' Indeed, the fact of the matter is that most suits against the
9
basic rationUnited States are triable by court and not byjury' l-the
ale, it would appear. being a fear of the deep pocket syndrome."'
On the other hand, in formal condemnation proceedings in federal
district courts, any party may have a trial by jury on the issue of just
compensation "unless the court in its discretion orders that, because
of the character, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons in the interest of justice, the issue of
compensation shall be determined by a commission, 2'" ' This rule
replaced the previous practice of following state procedure; at the time
of the adoption of the rule, some 43 states provided for a jury in
condemnation actions. 2 2 When the issue arises, jury trial is the fa197. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970); Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469 (1962) (equitable "clean-up" doctrine does not deprive plaintiff of jury trial for legal issues);
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959); Note, Federal Courts: Right to Jury
Trial in Cases Involving Both Equitableand Legal Issues. 47 CALIF. L. REv. 760 (1959).
198. Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960); United States
v. Green, 107 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1939). On the right of the United States to attach conditions
to waivers of sovereign immunity, see Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967); United States
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 306 (1960); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880). Such limitations
and conditions are, however, to be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be
implied. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957).
In Reynolds v. United States, 397 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court specifically reaffirmed that
there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in eminent domain proceedings.
199. See SCHWARTZ &JACOBY,TEXT 93.
200. See United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 23-24 (1970) (dissent). Both actions under
the Tucker Act, whether brought in a district court or in the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2402
(1970) (no actions in the Court of Claims are tried before a jury), and under the FTCA, 28
U.S.C. § 2402 (1970) are tried without a jury, although under the FTCA the court may empanel
an advisory jury. See FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Boston v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 22 (D. Hawaii
1966); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 39.10[1], n.8 (2d ed. 1968). A significant exception
is the right to trial by jury in suits for income tax refunds. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970).
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 71a(h).
38.22(2) (1971).
202. 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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vored procedure. and appointment of commissioners the exception. 2" 3
In 1967, the Congress amended the one provision of law that made
the commissioner system mandatory. in connection with Tennessee
2
Valley Authority acquisitions, to permit a jury trial. 11
While, as a matter of first impression. it might be argued that trial
by jury should be provided for, consistency with prior waiver statutes
of general scope and with the basically equitable nature of quiet title
would support the proposition that no jury trial be provided in statutory reform in the land title dispute area. 05 However, the fact that a
jury trial is provided in formal condemnation proceedings, reinforces
the point already made that the United States should be required to
follow statutory procedures where the seizure of land was unauthorized by Congress.
Statute of Limitations. Waiver statutes have generally set a time
period within which an action may be brought-for example, the
Tucker Act provides for six years.2 6 and the FTCA for two. 07 The
limitation problem in suits involving real property, however, presents
special perplexities.
The classic limitation period in private real property disputes is
twenty years 20 8 subject to extensions for various forms of disabilities.
While the trend is for shorter limitation periods and reduction of
203. United States v. 2,862.88 Acres of Land, 310 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1962), modified on
othergrounds, 376 U.S. 192 (1964); Parks v. United States, 293 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1961). See
Jurgensmeyer, FederalRule of Civil Procedure, 71A(h) Land Commissions: The First Fifteen
Years, 43 IND. L.J. 677 (1968).
204. 16 U.S.C. § 831x (1970). In its report, the Senate Committee commented: "While the
committee makes no judgment as to the benefits of either the commissioner or jury-trial system,
it does feel that a right to trial-by-jury is basic to our American way of life, and accordingly
recommends adoption of this legislation." 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 3659.
205. The Justice bill and the Senate-passed bill so provide. JUSTICE BILL § 2409a(e).
206. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2501 (1970). The time is extended for those "under legal disability
or beyond the seas." Id. § 2401. The limitation is a nonwaivable question of subject matter
jurisdiction and may be raised at any time. Christian Beacon v. United States, 322 F.2d 512
(3d Cir. 1963); Berry v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 190 (Ct. Cl. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
938 (1955). in inverse condemnation actions, interesting questions may arise; for example, when
is the asserted possession of the United States sufficient so that a constitutional taking has
occurred and the statute commenced to run? See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745
(1947); SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT 93. No statute of limitations appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2410
(1970), authorizing suits against the United States in quiet title actions where the federal interest
is a lien.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970). Unlike the Tucker Act, no extension period is provided.
208. 21 Jac. I, c. 16, §§ 1, 2 (1623).
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extensions. 209 such statutes are generally considerably longer than the
limitations on contract or tort actions. The pressure for shortened

periods probably arises from an increasing desire to assure the validity of titles, a purpose which the statute of limitations serves in cases
of adverse possession. 2 " Where the United States has actual posses-

sion of disputed real property. therefore, it might be desirable that
challenges to the title of the United States be brought with reasonable

promptness. Since a claimant under the Tucker Act has only six years
within which to bring his claim in inverse condemnation,21 a case can

be made for the same period under a waiver permitting other forms
212
of relief.

209. See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER, & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 72627 (1971); C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 248-53 (1968). California's statute is as short
as five years. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 324, 325 (West 1954).
210. See P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES §§ 51-60 (2d ed. 1970); Simes & Taylor,
Improvement of Conveyancing By Legislation, in 3 Ai. LAW OF PROP. § 15.2 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
211. While the possession required for the statute of limitations to run in favor of an adverse
possessor is not necessarily entirely coextensive with the possession sufficient to constitute a
"taking" under the fifth amendment, compare 3 AM. LAW OF PROP. § 15.3 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952) with United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the situations are sufficiently analogous so that no great point need be made of the difference.
212. Whether the six-year period should be absolute is a close question. The Tucker Act
itself provides for extension where the claimant is under a disability. See note 206 supra.
However, there, no overriding need for prompt action is involved, since the only remedy is
monetary damages. While of course problems of proof are presented by delays, it is not difficult
to make a policy decision that such problems are outweighed by the inequity of barring a claim
to one under disability. However, where the action to be permitted involves the right to oust
the United States from possession, it is less clear that considerations of certainty in title are
not paramount. Still, since in any case where the continued possession of the United States is
desirable and authorized, the proposed waiver would presumably bar ejectment, it would appear
that the equities would favor permitting extension in the case of disability, as with the Tucker
Act.
Even if the six-year period is adopted as the statute of limitations under the quiet title statute
where the United States is in possession, there is a certain lack of full coverage. The intent is to
have the period serve as a title determinant just as the statute of limitations normally operates
in adverse possession situations. It has been said that the United States can indeed acquire title
to land "by adverse possession," even though it could not be sued in its own name. See Stanley
v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893); United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379 (D. Tenn.
1951); United States v. Collins, 78 F. Supp. 259 (D. Va. 1948); 6 R. POWELL. REAL PROPERTY
738 (1965); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 678 (1970). These cases were decided, however, when United
States v. Lee would have upheld an ejectment action against the federal possessors individually,
and there may be some doubt as to the result if the true owner had no relief whatever, as in the
post-Malone era. Cf. Johnson v. Oregon, 418 P.2d 509 (Ore. 1966), opinion withdrawn, 423
P.2d 964 (Ore. 1967). In United States v. Chatham, 323 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1963), the United
States brought a quiet title action following an invalid condemnation action many years pre-
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The appropriate period of limitation, however, is a more complex
question where the claim of the United States is nonpossessory. either
because the United States has not chosen to assert a possessory right
or because the claim is intrinsically nonpossessory. The important
determination is whether claimants suing under the waiver should be
put in a position of claimants in a purely private dispute, or in a
position where they have more limited rights because their conflict is
with the federal government. Arguably. the waiver establishes new
rights and, unlike the private quiet title action, does not constitute an
embellishment of existing rights; therefore the consent need not set up
a system analogous to the private situation. But no reason appears
why a different doctrine should apply as against the nonpossessing
sovereign. The rules fashioned in the private context are based on
experience and reason.
The fundamental operative principle is that the right to bring an
action to quiet title is not in itself enough to commence the running
of any limitation period. This is in significant contrast to the general
rule that a cause of action accrues when suit may be maintained
thereon, and the statute of limitations then begins to run.2 1 3 For example. a claimant in possession may bring a quiet title action at any time
against a rival private claimant out of possession. However, he certainly need not, for no statute of limitations runs against him-the
statute by its terms applies only to bar actions for the recovery of real
property. 21 4 and a claimant in possession may wait until his possession
viously. It asserted good title by adverse possession, and the court seemed to assume this would
have been a valid basis for good title. However, it had not held actual possession of the property,
and the court held that the color of title given by the invalid condemnation action was not
sufficient to cause the statute to run. The difficulty is that neither the Tucker Act limitation
nor that in the quiet title statute technically operates as a final determinant of title, as does true
adverse possession. While the practical result will be the same whenever the United States
continuously holds possession, cases may arise where it is out of possession and the private
claimant asserts, after taking possession, that true title never vested in the United States, a
technically tenable position. If the six years are to serve as the congressional determination that
the period of adverse possession for the United States is to be that time, it would be best if the
waiver statute clearly so stated.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Wurtz. 303 U.S. 414 (1938); Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L.
Soc'y, 23 Cal. 2d 719, 146 P.2d 673 (1944).
214. However, once the statute has run in favor of one in possession, equity will act affirmatively to quiet the possessor's title as against the prior owner, Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533
(1892); W. WAIsH, EQUITY 10 14-35 (1930), and otherwise recognize the adverse possessor's
good title. Smith v. Clark. 248 Ill. 255, 93 N.E. 727 (1910) (equitable remedies cut off);
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918).
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is disturbed or his title attacked before taking steps to vindicate his

rights.2 11 That is to say. the private claimant in possession has no
statute of limitations running against him in the event he takes no
action at all against the claimant out of possession, and indeed the
statute is running in his favor wherever the rival claimant has a present right of possession.
Where the dispute is over an interest not affected by possession.
such as an easement, profit, restrictive covenant, or other incorporeal

interest, it appears that the statutory limitation period does not
commence until the nonpossessory interest is challenged.2 16 Similarly.
215. Fulton v. McCullough, 232 Iowa 1220, 7 N.W.2d 910 (1943) (quiet title action: plaintiff in possession claimed title based on unacknowledged deed delivered to plaintiff; held, statute
did not begin to run when unacknowledged deed delivered, plaintiff's suit not barred); Jones v.
Hammond, 118 Kan. 479, 235 P. 857 (1925) (action to remove cloud by plaintiff in possession;
statute of limitations ran against de facto mortgagee, but not against plaintiff); Cooper v, Rhea,
82 Kan. 109, 107 P. 799 (1910) (action to remove cloud upon title by one in possession referred
to as "continuing right," never barred by the statute of limitations while the cloud continues
to exist); Cauble v. Trexler, 227 N.C. 207, 42 S.E.2d 77 (1947) (action to remove cloud of void
mortgage; "continuing right"); Ford v. Clendenin, 215 N.Y. 10, 109 N.E. 124 (1915) ("The
owner of real property who is in possession may wait until his possession is invaded or his title
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right").
None of the above cases held that a claimant in possession was barred by the statute. It is,
therefore, difficult to tell what would be a sufficient "invasion" or "attack" to trigger the
statute of limitations. The cases dealing with whether laches bar suits by claimants in possession
suggest that a lawsuit would certainly be a sufficient attack, see Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U.S.
387 (1889), but it is unlikely that a party in possession will fail to take action after being made
the subject of a lawsuit. As to whether words will trigger the statute, see Brainard v. Buck, 184
U.S. 99 (1902), where plaintiff's "passive acquiescense" in the "mere hope" of another that
he could keep title to the property, did not bar the plaintiff on the grounds of laches. But cf.
Ruckman v. Cory, supra, where statements of the nonpossessing party concerning the ownership
,of the land were not admitted into evidence. Whether these statements would have subjected the
plaintiff to laches was not discussed.
216. See, e.g., New England Home for Deaf Mutes v. Leader Filling Stations Corp., 276
Mass. 153, 177 N.E. 97 (1931) (erection and maintenance of structures for longer than the term
required for prescription irreconcilable with rights of easement owner, thereby extinguishing the
easement); Graham v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 315 Pa. 572, 173 A. 311 (1934)
("Nothing less than an absolute denial of the right, followed by an enjoyment inconsistent with
its existence for a period of twenty-one years or more, can amount to an extinguishment of it");
Sabins v. McAlister, 116 Vt. 302, 76 A.2d 106 (1950) (easement not lost where fee owners did
nothing to which easement owners could object); Scampini v. Rizzi, 106 Vt. 281, 172 A. 619
(1934) (obstruction of right of way by building on part of it not sufficient to extinguish entire
easement; "The tenant must unfurl his flag on his land, and keep it flying so that the owner
may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his dominions and planted his standard of
conquest"); In re Nisbet and Potts' Contract [1905] 1 Ch. 391, affd [1906] 1 Ch. 386 (restrictive covenant held enforceable against one who got title by mesne conveyances from an adverse
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where the dispute is over an interest which may become but is not yet
possessory-such as a remainder, reversion, right of re-entry, unripened lien, or inchoate dower 217-the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the interest becomes possessory. and an action in
ejectment against the rival claimant in possession thus is possible.2 18
The justification for this is that the action to quiet title was designed
as an expansion, not a limitation, of available legal remedies. 219 Thus
the legal statute of limitations operates as the outside limit within
which the quiet title action must be brought 2 20-that is, after the
limitation has run adverse possession will constitute the defendant as
both the equitable and legal owner of the disputed interest.
It is true that laches or estoppel may bar a claimant from quiet
title relief even if a legal statute of limitations has not run. In the case
of the plaintiff in possession, the defendant out of possession must
interfere with the claimant's possession or attack his title; lapse of
possessor; adverse possessor whose legal title has ripened is not freed from obligation of a

negative covenant);

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 539, comment i (1944). See also 3 AM.

LAW

OF PROP. §§ 15.13, 15.14 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
217. In several states marketable title statutes may affect remainder interests. See I Am.
LAW OF PROP.

§ 4.115 (A.J. Casnered. 1952).

218. See, e.g., Superior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn, 242 Ky. 814, 47 S.W.2d 973 (1931). 1 Am.
LAW OF PROP. § 4.113; 3 id. § 15.8 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 301 (1967). Decisions in Nebraska and Iowa have taken the position that since a
quiet title action is available to a future interest owner, the statute should run. Lane v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941); Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W.
302 (1917); Foster, Nebraska Law of Adverse Possession, 23 NEB. L. REV. 105, 112-16 (1944).
However in Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940) and Unick v. St. Joseph Loan
&Trust Co., 146 Neb. 789, 21 N.W.2d 752 (1946), Nebraska adopted the majority rule.

219. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940). The RESTATEMENT

OF PROPERTY

firmly adopts this position:
Frequently the owner of a future interest as such can establish his ownership by a
suit in equity to quiet title or to remove a cloud upon title or by analogous statutory
proceedings legal or equitable. It might be reasoned that this fact should require him to
avail himself of these rights of action and that the statutory period should thenceforth
run, not only upon these equitable and statutory proceedings, but also upon the action
of ejectment which might be brought when the interest becomes present. However, these
equitable and statutory proceedings are considered to be created for the additional protection of the owner of the future interest. . . .Statutes of limitations are rarely in terms
applicable to suits to quiet title and to remove cloud on title and to statutory proceedings
for the trial of title. However, these types of proceedings are considered as supplementary
to the possessory actions, usually ejectment; and the statute of limitations is applied to
them in the same manner as it is applied to such actions. To bar these proceedings while
an action to recover possession can still be brought would give the adverse possessor no
substantial protection. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 222, comments d & e (1936).
220. See note 214 supra.
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time alone is not enough; 221 although where the delay has prejudiced
the defendant or third persons, or where the defendant has relied to
his detriment on actions or statements of the claimant, relief may be
denied under the rubric of either laches or estoppel. 222 Such defenses
would be available to the United States under the statutory waiver in
sufficient protection without an
appropriate cases. and should provide
223
limitations.
of
statute
inflexible
Thus. the statutory waiver permitting actions in the nature of
quiet title against the United States would present a serious problem
if the mere right to bring an action thereunder were sufficient to cause
the action to accrue and thus to start to run any limitation period
provided in the statute. Private parties in possession may have no
knowledge of the sovereign's interest, and placing upon them the duty
to institute an action would be contrary to established legal doctrine.
Indeed, the result of such a provision might be that the government's
non-adverse non-possession would effectively transfer title to the government as far as the right to specific relief is concerned-a rather odd
paradox.
It would not seem excessively difficult to adopt from private law
the types of events which would trigger a wholly private right of
action. One mechanism for instituting this type of rule would be a
simple statutory provision that the cause of action against the government accrues only at such time as under applicable state law the
limitation period would begin to run on a quiet title action.
This raises the question. however, whether it is desirable for state
law to determine when the statute begins to run. Under the FTCA.
with its two-year statute, the question has arisen in a number of cases
and the courts have split, with the majority holding that federal law
221. See. e.g., United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507 (1919); Brainard
v. Buck, 184 U.S. 99 (1902); Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U.S. 387 (1889); Miller v. Henry, 105 Ark.
261, 150 S.W. 700 (1912); Atkin v. Westfall, 246 Iowa 822, 69 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1955); Finley
v. Finley, 43 Wash. 2d 755, 264 P.2d 246 (1953). The cases indicate that the doctrines of laches
and estoppel are used practically interchangeably, but in cases where estoppel is claimed there
is usually some alleged manifestation of acquiescence by the claimant.
222. See Bannard v. Duncan, 79 Neb. 189, 112 N.W. 353 (1907); cf. Clark v. Glos, 180 III.
556, 54 N.E. 631 (1899).
223. Conversely the PLLRC has recommended that laches and estoppel should apply
against the United States. They concluded that their innate flexibility and equitable nature
would serve to protect the United States against their unjust application. See PLLRC REPORT
261.
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determines the question. 224 The basic argument for the applicability
of state law is that the FTCA provides that the United States shall
be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances ' 225 and that, logically, a substantive right arises only when a judicial action may be brought on it.226
The contrary result is based on considerations of uniformity-that is.
the designation in the statute of a period of limitation leads to the
conclusion that Congress intended that the period within which claimants must bring suit should be identical, regardless of where the acts
227
occurred that led to the claim.
In the case of title disputes over land, the argument is even
stronger that nationwide uniformity is desirable. The United States
is entitled to know that on the basis of certain acts, a period of time
has begun to run after which its title may not be challenged, and it is
difficult to see why the peculiarities of individual state laws should be
determinative on the issue. The key point is that in fashioning such a
federal rule, the legislature and courts should be sensitive to and aware
of the general state doctrines applicable to limitations periods for
quiet title actions.22 s
Retroactivity. Related to the question of the statute of limitations
is whether, and to what degree, any waiver of sovereign immunity
should apply to existing disputes, since such a statute raises the specter of opened floodgates. This is not an entirely unjustified concern
of overworked and harassed federal lawyers. 229 The problem is in
224. JAYSON § 277.01.
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
226. See Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305, 309 (1st Cir. 1959).
227. See Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962). The pressure toward such
uniformity is reflected in cases which hold that the two-year period under the FTCA is applicable even where state law imposes a shorter period of limitation. JAYSON § 276. See, e.g., United
States v. Westfall, 197 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952).
228. The Justice bill provides that actions are barred under the statute "unless the complaint
is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." JUSTICE BILL § 2409a(f). The
Senate-passed bill amended this section to provide that the complaint must be filed within six
years after the "claim for relief" first accrues and that such claim shall be deemed to have
accrued "upon actual knowledge of the claim of the United States."
229. As just one instance, in 16 months in 1969-1970, cases of an injunctive nature increased
from 3400 to 7800. Hearings on Sovereign Immunity 67. At that hearing, Assistant Attorney
General W.D. Ruckelshaus presented in some detail the Department of Justice's concern about
a general waiver of sovereign immunity leading to an unacceptable increase in judicial activity.
See also id. 64-75.
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assessing the seriousness of the threat and fashioning an appropriate
response.
Initially, the desirability of settling disputes about title to interests
in land must be conceded. As our most fundamental resource, land
can be put to its highest and most productive use only where title to
it is clear. Much academic and legislative activity has for years been
devoted to various mechanisms for enhancing the marketability of
land by resolution of various title defects.21 Considerable inconvenience is justified on economic grounds alone if the result will be
more certain titles.
One can be of two minds about the floodgates probability. Agitation for reform has been late in coming and modest in intensity. If a
massive head of prospective cases had built up, the pressure would
have long since been manifested, especially when it is considered that
co.ngressional impatience with the burdensome volume of private
bills for contract and tort relief was a significant factor in the establishment of the Court of Claims and the enactments of the Tucker
Act and the FTCA.?3 Although pressures of such intensity have not
been detected in the property dispute field. 232 There is probably no
accurate way to assess the burden which a full statutory retroactive
effect would impose.
Analysis of the effects of previous waivers is not particularly en230. The literature is immense. The latest treatise is P. BAYSE. CLEARING LAND TITLES (2d
ed. 1970). The numerous and varying forms of curative and marketable title acts adopted and
proposed are discussed therein in detail. See also L. SImEs & C. TAYLOR. IMPROVEMENT Or
CONVEYANCING By LEGISLATION (1960).
231. Many good articles exist describing the origins and activities of the Court of Claims.
See, e.g.. Ellison, The U.S. Court of Claims. Keeper of the Nation's Conscience for One
Hundred Years, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 251 (1956). An extensive bibliography is cited in
SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT 75.

232. The Department of Justice has asserted that "many. . . situations exist in which there
is an undoubtedly sincere claim to title in land also claimed by the United States," Statement
from Clyde 0. Martz, Assistant Attorney General, Lands Division, in National Archives files
of the PLLRC, dated April 5, 1968, and the American Land Title Association believes that
"hundreds of such actual or potential claims exist today." Statement by American Land Title
Association on S. 216, dated September 30, 1971. The PLLRC report itself acknowledges that
the lack of manpower in federal land managing agencies to make the investigations required to
defend the government's claims was at least historically a justification for sovereign immunity,
although it concludes that this appears no longer to be the case. PLLRC REPORT 261. On the
other hand, the Department of the Interior, in commenting upon the PLLRC proposal, suggested that no such waiver was needed because so few disputes existed to which the waiver might
apply.
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lightening. When the McCarren Amendment.,3 authorizing suits
against the United States in water rights disputes, was originally
proposed. a Department ofthe Interior official expressed grave concern over the floodgates issue by saying that "it is clear to me that
enactment of the bill could lead to a tremendous volume of unwarranted litigation." '34 However, very few reported cases have reached
3 5 When
the courts in the nearly twenty years since its enactment.1
the
FTCA was passed on August 2, 1946, the floodgates issue wag handled by making the act applicable only to claims accruing on or after
January 1, 19452 6-which was closely related to the one-year statute
of limitations originally provided. 3 7 The FTCA, however. may be
distinguished by the fact that prior to its enactment the nonavailability of tort relief affected only the immediate parties and had no in rem
effect.
With property title disputes, however, a solely prospective application of a quiet title act28 will result in the continuance of outstanding
but unresolvable disputes, with accompanying uncertainty of true
ownership and all the drawbacks presented thereby. Furthermore.
considering the vast bulk of federal land transactions which have
already taken place, the usefulness of a quiet title action which ex233. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
234. Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Committee on the
Judiciary, dated August 3, 1951, quoted in United States v. District Court, 169 Col. 555, 582,
458 P.2d 760, 773 (1969).
235. Cf. Scanwell Labs, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
The spectacle of opening a Pandora's box of litigation has always seemed groundless to
us, particularly in the area of standing to sue. Certainly the same hue and cry went up
when the states relaxed the criteria for standing to sue; but so far the dockets in the states
have not increased appreciably as a result of new cases in which standing would previously have been denied.
236. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 403(a), 60 Stat. 843.
237. Id. § 420.
238. The Justice bill in an early form provided that "the provisions of this Act shall be
prospective in operation, and shall not apply to any claim or right of action which accrued prior
to the date of the enactment of this Act." Hearings on Sovereign Immunity 154. As finally
presented to the Congress, the draft legislation omits the first phrase, § 4, but the cover letter
makes it clear that "since pre-existing claims can be settled as heretofore, under the Tucker
Act or by special act of Congress, and because we wish to ensure that the workload of the
Department and the courts under this legislation can devejop at a rate which can be absorbed,
we have made the draft bill prospective in operation." The Senate-passed bill struck out this
section entirely, and instead amended the statute of limitations section to provide that actions
would be barred unless begun "within six years after the claim for relief first accrues or within
two years after the effective date of this Act, whichever is later." (emphasis added)

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972:15

indeed, a limited solution. To exclude all
cludes all existing claims is,
claims existing as of the date of the Act is particularly anomalous if,
as is proper,23 claims under a quiet title statute are construed not to
accrue for limitations purposes until possession is disturbed or other
active, challenge asserted. Yet, even such an interpretation would be
to exclude from operation of the Act most present active disputes with
the United States but not inchoate disputes.
The purpose of the statute, in essence, should be to provide a
mechanism to resolve all land title disputes with the sovereign, present
and future. To do so, no existing disputes should be barred.2 4 In
particular, the statute should be available to private parties, who,
prior to its passage, were wholly without judicial remedy in title disputes with the United States-such as cases not involving a Tucker
Act taking or not subject to prior statutory waivers. The limitations
period built into the statute itself could be effective in establishing an
outside limit of six years as to any such disputes which, but for
sovereign immunity. a cause of action in quiet title would have ac241
crued.
No significant danger to the interests of the United States will
arise from making the waiver retroactive because just as the sovereign
may waive its immunity, the waiver may also be withdrawn. The
power to so withdraw knows no limitation. 42 nor the power to condition its operation.24 3 Should the floodgates open, the Congress will be
able to fashion such procedures as are necessary to permit a reasonable and orderly channeling of the waters. But before procedures of this
nature are formulated, the floodgates should first be opened and the
results awaited. 4
239. See notes 206-28 supra and accompanying text.
240. Possibly adverse possession, laches, or estoppel would operate to bar existing claims
in some cases. See notes 221-24 supra and accompanying text.
241. See notes 206-28 supra and accompanying text.
242. Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 318 U.S. 357, 362 (1943); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1934).
243. See notes 198-200 supra and accompanying text.
244. In the last analysis, it may come down to the words of Jerre Williams, then chairman
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, in dealing with the "floodgates" objection to a general waiver of sovereign immunity: "The second answer is [the first answer was
that there wouldn't be that much litigation anyhow] that the government of the United States
must be willing to assume its responsibility to play openly and fairly with its citizens. And if it
gets crank suits, as it will, if it gets frivolous suits, it should deal with those suits with the honest
defenses . . . whatever they are. And it should take whatever effort, whatever time, whatever
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Mesh with existing statutes. Federal land laws are of a bewildering

multiplicity and prolixity. Enacted piecemeal over a century and a
half, they often mesh imperfectly. if at all. 245 In the area of land title
disputes, in addition, special waiver statutes have been enacted to
meet special needs, as already discussed. Thus, the issue arises as to
the degree to which the passage of a quiet title statute should supplement or supersede existing legislation. 26 Traditionally, the quiet title
remedy was viewed as an expansion, not a duplication, of existing
remedies. Where adequate relief at law existed, the equitable remedy
was unavailable. Increasingly, however, the trend has been to consider
quiet title as an alternative and supplementive form of relief which is
24 7
declaratory in nature-as opposed to compensatory or specific.
At present, the remedies available in a private land title dispute
with the United States fall into two categories. Under the Tucker Act,
one can in some cases receive compensatory relief, which is the exclusive and generally inadequate remedy. In partition suits, lien claims
and water rights, on the other hand, the relief available is similar to
declaratory and specific in nature.
that of a quiet title action-that is,
Conceding that damages-even where available" 4,-are not an adequate remedy in land title disputes, it follows that the quiet title action
should not automatically be foreclosed in the first category of cases.
If the United States wishes to have continued possession, notwithmoney is necessary, to deal fairly with its citizens." Hearings on Sovereign Immunity 11. The
government's argument on the "floodgates" issue in a general waiver of sovereign immunity
appears in id. 51-52, 60, 66-69, 255-57. The government's recommendation is that instead of a
blanket waiver, Congress should make a careful determination of the specific types of cases that
should be subject to judicial review and provide appropriate safeguards for each type of waiver.
Adoption of a quiet title statute is suggested as one such example of an appropriate waiver!
245. See generally S. REP. No. 1444, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The PLLRC's DIGEST
OF PuBLIc LAND LAws (1968) contains some 2,700 separate enactments covering, in oneparagraph summaries, 858 pages.
246. The Justice bill and the Senate-passed bill completely exclude "water rights" and
"security interests" disputes from its operation. They also exclude actions which "may be or
could have been brought" under provisions dealing with partitions, mortgages and other liens,
and water rights. See notes 63-74 supra and accompanying text. The proposed language also
excludes such actions as might have been brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1970), which
encompass both the Tucker Act and the FTCA. JUSTICE BILL § 2409a(a). It is not clear whether
this is intended to exclude the quiet title remedy in cases where compensation could be obtained
under the Tucker Act. Cf. id. § 2409a(b).
247. See notes 151-55 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 162-71 supra and accompanying text.
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standing a decision against it as to ownership, the quiet title statute
can and should make provision for such an event.249
With regard to waivers which already provide for specific relief,
however, the issue is not so clear. These waivers are designed with
safeguards to meet the special situations involved.2 10 To the extent that
relief of a declaratory nature is available under such statutes, it is
appropriate that actions of this nature be excluded from the operation
of the general quiet title statute, at least until its practical implementation and operation can be observed. However, the argument for total
exclusion of certain types of land disputes from the operation of the
quiet title statute is unclear. For example, sovereign immunity has
already been waived as to water right disputes involving a "general

adjudication" of a river system.2I If the quiet title statute is to exclude
water rights disputes altogether from its operation, the resolution of
such disputes not involving a "general adjudication," will continue
to lie totally outside any remedy, other than possible Tucker Act
relief. With a provision in the quiet title statute authorizing continued
United States possession or use of disputed interests where such
seizure is authorized by law, and with preliminary injunctive relief
prohibited, it is difficult to see any justification for their total
exclusion.

25 2

249. See notes 180-87 supra and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1970). See notes 62-74 supra and accompanying text.
251. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text. The Justice
bill also provides for the total exclusion of "trust or restricted Indian lands." JUSTICE BILL
§ 2409a(a). The scope of the exclusion must be found in the arcane inner reaches of Indian land
lore. See Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968); M. PRICE, NATIVE AMERICAN LAW
MANUAL 562 et seq. (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958). The
exclusion has been explained as follows: "The Federal government has over the years made
specific commitments to the Indian People through written treaties and through informal and
formal agreements to hold lands for the Indians in trust. . . . A unilateral waiver of the defense
of sovereign immunity as to this land would, we feel, be contrary to President Nixon's pledge
not to abridge the historic relationship between the Federal government and the Indians without
the consent of the Indians." Testimony of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior on S.
216 and S. 579, September 30, 1971. Some 50 million acres are involved in the exclusion. See
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT ON INDIAN LANDS (1971). It may be questioned,
however, whether a waiver of sovereign immunity could fairly be deemed a breach of trust, since
only property not in fact owned by the Indians could ultimately be affected. The Senate-passed
bill adds to the Justice bill exclusions an additional one, providing that the act does not apply
to "any lands claimed by Indian or Native people based upon aboriginal right, title, use or
occupancy."
252. Discussion has already appeared as to the class of cases involving disputes over administrative actions relating to the management and disposition of public lands which are not land
title disputes, and as to which sovereign immunity is not now generally a significant obstacle to
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Disclaimer of interest. One of the vital constitutional limitations
upon the executive branch is its inability to dispose of federal property
without the authorization of Congress, which, of course, constitutes
a significant limitation on effective resolution of clouds upon title
involving the United States. 253 A quiet title statute, then, to be effective must provide for actions against the United States whenever it
appears to have any possible interest in title to land. The determination of when the United States has an interest, moreover, should not
turn on whether the United States in fact claims an interest,254 because
the determination of the insignificance or nonexistence of such an
interest by the analysis of the executive branch will not suffice to
eliminate the cloud-the critical question is what others may think.
Rather, the action should be open to anyone who thinks the United
States may have an interest.
judicial review. See notes 13 & 54-61 supra and accompanying text. Such disputes would not
typically be amenable to judicial resolution in actions in'the nature of quiet title. To the extent
that claims by individuals to public lands under such statutes or regulations may be elevated to
the status of title disputes, see, e.g., note 13 supra with respect to mining claims, it is possible
that on occasion judicial relief under a statute of the type herein discussed could be involved.
However, as a general matter, actions in the nature of quiet title are not considered the appropriate remedy even in actions by the holder of an asserted "equitable" title against the holder of
the legal title, such as the vendee against the vendor in an unexecuted contract for the sale of
real property. See, e.g., Chase v. Cameron, 33 Cal. 231, 65 P. 460 (1901); MacNeil Bros. Co.
v. State Realty Co., 131 N.E.2d 178 (Mass. 1956); cf. White v. GSA, 343 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.
1965). Exceptions do exist where, for example, the legal title holder is in effect a stakeholder,
see, e.g., O'Keefe v. Aptos Land & Water Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 772, 286 P.2d 417 (1955), or
under the particular wording of a statute. See, e.g.. Polson Sheep Co. v. Owen, 106 P.2d 181
(Mont. 1940). In any event, it is essential that the passage of legislation permitting the institution of actions to quiet title against the United States not be construed as directly or indirectly
adversely affecting the present longstanding tradition and practice of nonstatutory judicial
review of public land determinations. See notes 54-61 supra and accompanying text. The whole
purpose is to supplement, not foreclose, existing modes of relief. Note, for example, that there
is no statute of limitations applicable to nonstatutory review of administrative actions other
than laches. Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 807-08, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967).
253. An interesting analogy arises in the dispute over the power of executive branch officials
to settle disputes over breaches of government contracts. The Comptroller General has taken
the position that no such authority exists, since only the Congress may release or otherwise
dispose of the rights and property of the United States. See 44 Comp. Gen. 353 (1964). See
also Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (release of taxpayer's
surety bond by collector of internal revenue). An extensive discussion of the issue appears in
Shedd, Administrative Authority to Settle Claims for Breach of Government Contracts, 27
GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 481 (1959), an article with which, it is interesting to note, the Comptroller
General disagreed. 44 Comp. Gen. at 356-57.
254. The Justice bill provides that the action may be brought if "the United States claims
an interest." JUSTICE BILL § 2409aia).
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Conservation of governmental time and effort also dictates that
the executive branch be specifically empowered to disclaim any inter-

est when it determines that no governmental interest, in fact, exists.
The disclaimer authority might well go further and authorize a disclaimer when it appears that the interest has no significant value to

the United States or the chances of its validity being upheld are too
slight to justify the time and expense of trial.2 51 Such a disclaimer.

however, should not, in and of itself. cause the dismissal of the quiet
title action.2 56 The whole purpose of the action is to remove once and
for all the cloud, and the disclaimer by the United States should either

authorize the immediate entry of a quiet title judgment in favor of the
plaintiff as against the United States257 or the United States should

be authorized to deliver the equivalent of a quitclaim deed to the
plaintiff.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Tucker Act provides for con-

current jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and the United States
district court in actions up to $10,000, while actions in excess of
$10,000 may be heard only by the Court of Claims. 251Actions under
the FTCA. however, may only be brought in federal district court,

regardless of their amount.2 11 In neither case do state courts have any
255. Compare the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2410(e) (1970), which provides that where it
appears to an officer in the executive branch that the lien of the United States will not be wholly
or partly satisfied out of the proceeds of sale, "or that the claim of the United States has been
satisfied or by lapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable, such officer shall so report
to the Comptroller General who may issue a certificate releasing the property from such lien."
See generally Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power to Settle
and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 350 (1956). Authority does exist for
the executive branch to give quitclaim deeds in some situations. See 7 U.S.C. § 2253 (1970);
43 U.S.C. §§ 641a, 872 (1970).
256. The Justice bill provides that upon disclaimer prior to trial, the jurisdiction of the court
shalt cease. JUSTICE BILL § 2409a(d). The Senate-passed bill amends this section to require that
the disclaimer of the United States must be "confirmed" by decree of the court, and to provide
that where federal jurisdiction ceases for this reason, and there are other defendants, the case
shall be remanded to the appropriate state court.
257. The United States would not thereby be prejudicing the rights of third parties. The
quiet title action here is in personam against the United States and does not have an in rem
effect. Even after issuance of a formal patent, rival claimants can litigate their respective rights
to the former public land in a private law suit without thejoinder of the land officials. See Borox
Consol. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Anderson v. Clune, 269 U.S. 140 (1925); C.
McFARLAND, supra note 13, at 186.
258. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1970).
259. Id. § 1346(b).
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jurisdiction.26 It is equally clear that the United States, in waiving
immunity, may designate in which courts it may be sued. 61
Which courts are appropriate for quiet title actions against the
sovereign? It may be observed that matters of title are often questions
of state rather than federal law. 26 2 Furthermore, state courts have
extensive experience in dealing with matters of title.2 63 In addition, to
the extent that the "floodgates" argument expresses concern about
an overload upon the federal court system, as opposed to executive
branch officials, opening the door to state court jurisdiction would be
a significant ameliorative measure. And where the interest of the
United States is relatively marginal and other parties are the primary
disputants, the ability to include the United States in a state court
action would be particularly appropriate. On the other hand, no compelling argument can be made against exclusive federal jurisdiction,
particularly where the United States has possession of the disputed
260. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 13 n.28 (1962); JAYSON § 190.02.
261. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388 (1939).
262. A detailed study of the degree to which property interests of the United States are
determined by federal law as opposed to state law is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it
to say that in such matters, state law must govern in the absence of a federal statute or policy
making federal law applicable. United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 643 (5th Cir. 1971);
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 329 F.2d 85, 90 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Certain
Property, 306 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1962). Cf. United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d
142 (2d Cir. 1965) (applicable law in condemnation); Humble Oil v. Sun Oil, 191 F.2d 705 (5th
Cir. 1951) (applicable law in diversity action). Even Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. I (1842), acknowledged that state law should be looked to as regards "rights and titles to things having a
permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable
and territorial in their nature." Id. at 18.
Although in actions by the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970), the Erie rule is
inapplicable, still in the absence of a contesting federal statute or policy, suits by the government
to protect its property interests in land are local in nature. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S.
545 (1923); United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 643 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947); United States v. Marin Rock & Asphalt
Co., 296 F. Supp. 1213 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
Of course, in numerous cases, where federal actions involve the public land laws, federal law
will be controlling. Thus, "the construction of grants by the United States is a federal not a
state question . . . and involves the consideration of state questions only insofar as it may be
determined as a matter of federal law that the United.States has impliedly adopted and assented
to a state rule of construction as applicable to its conveyances." United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 28 (1935). See also Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966);
SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT ch. XIl; Mishkin, The Variousness of'Federal Law': Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for.Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
797 (1957).
263. Of course, so do the federal courts in diversity actions. See, e.g., Kron v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 449 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1971).
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land. The burden of the FTCA has apparently not proved excessive.
although it may be significant that in 1966 the Department of Justice
felt called upon to recommend legislation to permit more administrative settlements of disputed claims under the FTCA and other statutes. Among the aims of the proposals were to ease court congestion
and avoid unnecessary litigation.2 64 Delays occasioned by the necessity
of deferring to state tribunals appear to have been minimal in land
cases in federal courts.2 5 and of course the controlling law may well
be federal rather than state.
Should the workload prove excessive in actual practice. either
administrative settlement or a turn to state courts could be considered. Since the pattern in waiver statutes appears generally to provide
for exclusive federal jurisdiction 6 ' and since the removal provision
would normally be operative in any event.2 67 exclusive federal jurisdiction, at least at the outset, appears to be appropriate. 21
264. See 2 U.S.

CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2502-14 (1966).
265. A dramatic instance of the deference paid to state law in this regard appears in Leiter
Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 228-30 (1957), where the interpretation of a
Louisiana state statute affecting mineral rights was involved. The Supreme Court deliberately
modified the judgment of the court below to allow an expeditious interpretation of the state
statute in the state court. The court of appeals had issued a statutory injunction against prosecution of the state court proceedings, to which only the claimant and the lessees from the United
States were parties, not the United States eo nomine. The Supreme Court noted that the
Louisiana declaratory judgment procedure was available to secure such an interpretation of the
state statute and that the United States could appear to urge its interpretation of the statute.
See also Stanley .v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1893). See Mattis, Certificate of Questions
of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
717 (1969).
266. This is true with regard to the Tucker Act, and the FTCA, as mentioned in text, as
well as the statute authorizing partition actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 2409 (1970).
On the other hand, the water rights statute, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), and the foreclosure
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1970), permit suit in either federal or state courts. It has been
held that while they constitute waivers of sovereign immunity, they do not bestow jurisdiction
upon the federal district courts. In such actions, therefore, jurisdiction in the district courts must
be found in other provisions. See Wells v. Long, 162 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1947); In re Green River
Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956). The removal statute itself, 28 U.S.C. § 1444
(1970), may constitute such a grant of jurisdiction. Hood v. United States, 256 F.2d 522, 525
(9th Cir. 1958). See D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, CASEBOOK 191-94 (1963). While jurisdiction
is generally granted to the federal district courts in all actions in which the United States is a
plaintiff, such jurisdiction is more limited where it is a defendant. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1345
(1970) with id. § 1346.
267. The quiet title statute would clearly confer jurisdiction upon the district courts, JUSTICE
BILL § 1347a, and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) would authorize removal.
268. The statute should be carefully worded, however, to make it clear that federal jurisdiction is exclusive only when the United States is named as a party. Private litigants may have
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As to which federal court should be given jurisdiction, the district
court in which the property is located appears clearly to be the appropriate forum. 269 Both in terms of familiarity with local law and with
accessability to practitioners, the district court is preferable to the
other logical choice, the Court of Claims, which has been characterexpensive
ized as a "distant and unfamiliar tribunal, and one more
27
and time-consuming than a local federal district judge.1
The Jbrm of action. Related to the question of jurisdiction is the
issue of whether the waiver statute should attempt to frame essentially
a federal cause of action, or whether state remedies should be the basis
of relief. The latter would certainly be a straightforward and not
unprecedented approach. This was the general route followed with
respect to the waiver of sovereign immunity in actions involving water
rights. 27' and, to a lesser degree, in actions involving mortgages or
2 72
other liens claimed by the United States.
A waiver permitting quiet title actions to be brought against the
United States could be framed in terms allowing state law to control
as to the form of action and the ability to seek relief, interposing only
such safeguards as may be deemed crucial for protection of the United
States. Thus, just as with regard to foreclosure of liens where there is
disputes between themselves over title matters in land in which the United States claims an
interest but which does not involve the United States. In this regard, the Senate-passed bill
amends Justice bill section 2409a(a) to provide that the quiet title action may be brought against
the United States only where the interest clainied by the United States is adverse to the plaintiff,
but makes no corresponding amendment in Justice bill section 1347a.
269. The Justice bill and the Senate-passed bill so provide in the venue provision. JUSTICE
BILL § 1347a. If the property is located in more than one district in the same state, any such
district has proper venue.
270. Hearingson Sovereign Immunity 25-26. While it is true that Court of Claims commissioners, who hear cases as rough equivalents to trial judges, will travel to hear the testimony of
individual witnesses, most activities in relation to such hearings occur in Washington.
SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, TEXT 106. In Tucker Act actions, the Court of Claims would have
acquired some familiarity with determinations of title disputes, however, such cases are relatively rare in the totality of the court's work. Historical accident, rather than reasoned choice,
has thrown cases of this nature into the Court of Claims in the past. Finally, and perhaps most
compellingly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims traditionally has been limited to money
judgments only and not extended to actions of a declaratory nature. See United States v. King,
395 U.S. 1 (1969); Note, Declaratory Relief in Tucker Act Suits, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1169. The
power of the district courts to grant relief under the Tucker Act has been said to be no greater
or less than that possessed by the Court of Claims over the same kind of case. United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 591 (1941). See Note, 1968 DUKE L.J., supra, at 1178-80.
271. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). See United States v. Dist. Ct. in and for Co. of Eagle, Colo.,
401 U.S. 520 (1971).
272. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1970). See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960).

DUKE LAW JO URNA L

[Vol. 1972:15

a provision for judicial sale and a right of redemption.1 73 such critical
elements as continued possession by the United States pending final
judgment 2714 could be preserved in the waiver in land title disputes. In
other regards, the position of the United States would be brought in
line as closely as possible with that of private parties in land title
disputes under the law of the state where the land is located.
Such an approach. however, virtually assures both a confusing
and diverse application of procedural quirks turning on vagaries of
state law275 and, perhaps more importantly. a limitation on effective
judicial resolution of land title disputes. In part. this reflects the fact
that state laws now often postulate the availability of specific relief
in land disputes. For example, in those states where quiet title actions
lie only where the plaintiff has possession, it is assumed that the
plaintiff may first bring an ejectment action to gain possession. If.
however, this rule were applied where the possessor is the sovereign.
the rival claimant would be effectively deprived of the possibility of
27
relief. 1
The interests of prompt and efficient resolution of land disputes
would be better served by a federal cause of action providing the basic
framework of judicial relief and accommodating the particular needs
of the United States. While the needs of uniformity should not be
overriding in every regard where the United States is concerned, it
does appear that in this area a specific federal provision is fully justified. 277 The aim, it should be repeated, is to effectively provide for the
273. 24 U.S.C. § 2410 (1970).
274. See notes 178-87 supra and accompanying text.
275. See note 152 supra.
276. See notes 25-34 supra and accompanying text.
277. Upon passage of a quiet title statute, presumably the declaratory judgment provision
of the federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), would also become available as a theoretical
alternative remedy, although the existence of the quiet title statutory remedy would probably
cause relief to be denied. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964); 6A J. Moon,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.08(3). The provision has apparently been little used in real property
matters. In Mims v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Va. 1971), an attempt was made
to use the section as the jurisdictional basis to bring an action against the United States
involving a title dispute. The action of course failed on sovereign immunity grounds. Cf Miller
v. Udall, 368 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1966). The United States, on the other hand, has made use of
the section. See, e.g., Wyoming v. United States, 310 F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. den:ied.
372 U.S. 953 (1963).
Indeed, for that matter, the action for declaratory relief, were the United States to waive its
immunity thereunder in land title disputes, would provide a vehicle for the disposition of claims
against it without the risk of "interference with governmental processes" which bottoms the
current rationale for any survival of sovereign immunity. One of the reasons, indeed, for declara-
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efficient resolution of land title disputes with the United States.278
Therefore, to subject this process totally to the vagaries of state procedural law designed to adjust such disputes between private claimants
29
seems unwise. 7
CONCLUSION

The basic inequities in the present structure for resolution of land
title disputes with the sovereign are becoming increasingly accepted.
Sovereign immunity is under relentless attack,2 0 and the Administrative Conference of the United States at one of its earliest sessions
adopted a recommendation that the doctrine be limited "where it
blocks the rights of citizens to challenge in courts the legality of acts
of government administrators." ' While the recommendation itself
does not so state, it is clear that one of its objectives was an overruling
tory relief was to exclude the necessity of a plaintiff taking a step, often irrevocable, which might
entail serious liability. E. Borchard, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 26-28 (2d ed. 1941). However,
the desirability of special statutory safeguards in quiet title actions against the sovereign
militates against this solution, and in any event, actions under the declaratory judgment provision require separate jurisdictional grounds. J. Moore, supra, § 57.23. See note 114 supra.
278. The statute might well be extended to permit quiet title actions in disputed personal
property. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1970). Some state quiet title actions by express statutory
language or otherwise may be so used, see Chicago Auditorium Ass'n v. Willing, 20 F.2d 837,
840 (7th Cir. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 277 U.S. 274 (1928); Newman Machine Co. v.
Newman, 275 N.C. 189, 166 S.E.2d 63 (1969), although there is authority to the contrary,
Annot., 105 A.L.R. 295 (1936). Such actions involving personal property are relatively rare
since complicated title problems arise less frequently and an adequate remedy at law is more
often available.
279. The Justice bill provides for a federal cause of action "to adjudicate disputed titles to
real property," and by implication makes possession by plaintiff unnecessary. JUSTICE
BILL § 2409a(a). The Senate-passed bill changes the description of the action to "an action
• . . to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property." The cover letter from the Attorney
General makes clear the basic philosophy that uniformity at least as to the plaintiff's qualifications for instituting suit is desirable, and that the state law of real property would apply to decide
any questions not covered by federal law. The guiding principle of the FTCA is to accept liability
"... where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970);
JAYSON § 66.03. Even under the FTCA, however, though substantive state law determines the
existence of the claim, it was deemed best to establish a federal framework for relief. Similarly,
with regard to land title disputes while the state law may determine the substance of the title to
the real property, federal law should basically fashion the framework for relief.
280. See notes 15, 23 supra. See generally Project, Federal Administrative Law Develop,nents-1971, 1972 DUKEa L.J. 115, 233.
281. Recommendation No. 9, adopted October 21-22, 1969, published in Recommendations
and Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States 23 (1970). For subsequent
history, see note 23 supra.
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of Malone v. Bowdoin, so as to make available a general judicial

review of land title disputes with the United States.282 The House of

Delegates of the American Bar Association has adopted in principle

a similar proposal.2 1
More specifically, the Public Land Law Review Commission in
its 1970 report recommended that "citizens should be able to bring

quiet title actions in which the Government could be named as defendant.

' 284

The Commission recognized the rationale for sovereign

immunity as protecting official actions of governmental officials from
interference by the judiciary but concluded that this rationale does not
support the application of the doctrine in a suit in which the only
purpose is to determine the validity of the government's claim to title
25
in land.
The most hopeful development of all is the recent official submission to the Congress by the Department of Justice of a legislative

proposal for a quiet title statute, and its subsequent passage with
amendments by the Senate.?" Final enactment would significantly
open the door to specific judicial relief in land title disputes with the
United States. Although to date the bill remains with a House subcommittee, hearings have been held,217 and this measure could well
serve as the vehicle for long overdue reform.
282. See the consultant's report for the Conference, prepared by Professor Roger C. Cramton, published in Hearingson Sovereign Immunity 92, and the testimony of Professor Cramton.
Id. at 35. Even were this general waiver of sovereign immunity to pass the Congress, while
undoubtedly beneficial for some land disputes, it should still be supplemented by specific legislation authorizing a judicial determination of land titles in disputes between the United States
and private parties, both to provide subject-matter jurisdiction in the United States district
courts and to deal with necessary procedural aspects as discussed in this article, See Hearings
on Sovereign Immunity 142; Cramton 44649.
283. See note 23 supra.
284. PLLRC REPORT 260-61.
285. Congressman Aspinall has introduced a bill-the "Public Land Policy Act of
1971"-incorporating many of the recommendations of the PLLRC REPORT. H.R. 7211, 92nd
Sess. (1971). Among other things, the bill provides for the public lands of the United
Cong., 1st
States to be administered "so that the United States solely because it is the sovereign never
takes advantage of its position as landowner." Id. § 5(m)(2).
286. The letter from the Attorney General to the Congress, transmitting the draft legislation, is set out at 117 CONG. REc. S17530-31 (Nov. 3, 1971). The legislation was introduced in
the Senate as S. 2805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and in the House, as H.R. 11127, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) and is the product of several years of drafting and interdepartmental coordination in the executive branch. The text of the proposed legislation as submitted by the Department
of Justice is set out in the Appendix of this article.
287. Although no hearings were held by the Senate on the Justice proposal, as such, the
assistant attorney general in charge of the division of lands and natural resources testified on
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The time for action thus is here. Too many millions of acres and
too many thousands of boundary miles are involved to avoid the issue
further. Just as sovereign immunity was abolished as a defense in
contract cases in 1855, and tort cases in 1946, the time has now come

to abolish it in land title disputes with the sovereign-a last major
28
bastion of our monarchical heritage that the king can do no wrong.

September 30, 1971 with respect to a bill introduced by Senator Church which in broad terms
would have permitted quiet title actions to be brought against the United States. S. 216, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). At that time, the assistant attorney general proposed that the Justice
bill be substituted for the Church bill, and indicated that the Justice bill would be formally sent
to the Congress shortly thereafter, as it was. The Church bill was then reported out by the Senate
committee, incorporating the provisions of the proposed legislation submitted by the Department of Justice, although amended as discussed in notes 177, 191, 205, 228, 238, 251, 256, 268,
and 279 supra. Thus, the Justice bill, as amended, passed the Senate as S. 216. The bill was
referred to Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings were held
on February 24, 1972.
288. Professor Jaffe suggests that the slogan actually has been applied backwards. He says
its true meaning was that since the king can do no wrong, the courts will do what is necessary
to keep him in the right. Jaffe, supra note 19, at 3-4.
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APPENDIX

The following is the full text of the Justice Bill:

A BILL
To permit suits to adjudicate disputed titles to lands in which the
interest.
United States claims afi
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) chapter 85
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding after section
1347 of such title the following new section:
"§ 1347a. Disputed land titles

"The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of
civil actions under section 2409a to adjudicate disputed titles to lands
in which the United States claims an interest."
(b) The chapter analysis at the beginning of chapter 85 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating
to section 1347 the following new item: "1347a. Disputed land titles."
SEC. 2. Section 1402 of title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(d) Any civil action under section 2409a to quiet title to lands
claimed by the United States shall be brought in the district court of
the district where the land is located or, if located in different districts
in the same State, in any of such districts."
SEC. 3.
(a) Chapter 161 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding after section 2409 of such title the following new
section:
"§ 2409a. Actions to adjudicate disputed land titles

"(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a
civil action under this section to adjudicate disputed titles to real
property in which the United States claims an interest, other than
security interests and water rights. This section does not apply to trust
or restricted Indian lands, nor does it apply to or affect actions which
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may be or could have been brought under section 1346, 1347, 1491,
or 2410 of this title, section 7424, 7425, or 7426 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26 U.S.C. 7424, 7425, and 7426),
or section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952 (43 U.S.C. 666).
"(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or
control of any real property involved in any action under this section
pending a final judgment or decree and the conclusion of any appeal
therefrom; and if the final determination shall be adverse to the
United States, the United States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real property or of any part thereof as it may
elect, upon payment to the person determined to be entitled thereto
of an amount which upon such election the district court in the same
action shall determine to be just compensation for such possession or
control.
"(c) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of
the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right,
title, or interest claimed by the United States.
"(d) If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property
at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of the
civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the
authority conferred by section 1347a of this title.
"(e) A civil action against the United States under this section
shall be tried by the court without a jury.
"(f) Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless the
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.
"(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits
against the United States based upon adverse possession."
(b) The chapter analysis at the beginning of chapter 161 of title
28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating
to section 2409 the following new item:
"2409a. Actions to adjudicate disputed land titles."
SEC. 4. This Act shall not apply to any claim or right of action
which accrued prior to the date of its enactment.

